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I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary in South Africa functions as an integral part of the
apartheid system. Despite its nominal independence from the govern-
ment, the judiciary constitutes an arm of the white state. Although it has
at times come into conflict with the government, it applies the laws
which maintain the apartheid system and suppress resistance by the
black majority.
Black South Africans have consistently challenged the courts' legiti-
macy. Charged with treason and other political offenses, black leaders
such as Nelson Mandela' and, more recently, young guerrilla fighters
such as Ashley Forbes' have rejected the courts' right to exercise juris-
1. See Nelson Mandela's attack on the integrity of the court, N. MANDELA, No EAsY
WALK TO FREEDOM 125 (3d ed. 1978).
2. Refusing to plead to the charges against him, Ashley Forbes placed the following
statement in the court record:
With all due respects to Your Lordship and the learned Assessors, I refuse to plead
to the charges against me for certain reasons which I desire to place on record:
1. The inherent political system of racial discrimination ie. apartheid has prevented
the majority of the people in South Africa from participating in the making of
the laws which are now being enforced against me.
2. The charges against me are that I allegedly committed acts in order to eradicate
the apartheid system so that the majority of South Africans could participate in
the making of this country's law.
3. The international community, through the United Nations General Assembly
and Security Council, has repeatedly condemned the apartheid system as a crime
against humanity and has recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the op-
pressed people of South Africa in pursuance of their human and political rights
as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
4. The International Court of Justice has ruled that racial discrimination is a
breach of a country's obligations to the International community and that
apartheid is not in conformity with the international obligations assumed by
South Africa under the Charter of the United Nations.
5. Churches and leaders of the international and national religious community have
decreed that apartheid is a heresy.
6. Consequently I find myself in conscience unable to plead to charges which label
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diction over them.
The judiciary in a future nonracial, democratic South Africa will
emerge from the current struggle. The form that judiciary takes will in
large measure be determined by the nature of the transition to a new
society. The possibilities for a new judicial order can best be explored by
both analyzing the present judicial system and considering the changes
that have taken place in three countries that have recently undergone a
radical transition: Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.
Although these three countries experienced different forms of transi-
tion, each exemplifies how the various factors centrEa to this Note's anal-
ysis have been affected by the process of transition. These factors, which
affect the functioning of the judicial system and the stature of the courts
within these societies, include:
1. The structure and function of the judiciary in the society prior
to political transformation.
2. Restraints on the process of judicial transformation, including a
lack of resources and other social and political conditions cre-
ated by the process of political transition.
3. The political and legal restrictions on, or opportunities for, judi-
cial transformation created during the transition by the emer-
gence of a new constitutional framework.
me as a terrorist for opposing apartheid and I regard the prosecution itself as a
crime against humanity.
7. I furthermore state that my basic human rights, as embodied in the United Na-
tions Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have been violated in that:
(a) I was held in solitary confinement, without the right to legal representation
for many months under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, which I
found to be a vicious form of torture in itself;
(b) I, and others, have been tortured and/or coerced in many other ways to
divulge information and evidence to the security police and police at large
which information will presumably be used against both myself and these
other persons.
8. Lastly, with all due respects to Your Lordship, I foresee ray trial being used by
the State to deceive my fellow countrymen and the world at large into believing
that the judiciary is independent and that there is justice in South Africa. I be-
lieve that unjust laws cannot by definition be justly applied. Therefore I do not
believe that these proceedings can be just, or that the judicial system can be
independent or indeed that it can operate for any other purpose than for the
further entrenchment of white domination.
Consequently I refuse to plead to the charges.
I shall participate in these proceedings under protest in order to expose the methods
used by the governing regime through their security police and security forces in
general.
A. Forbes, Statement to the Court, Exhibit No. 1, The State v. Ashley Alexander Forbes et, al.,
Supreme Court of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) (unpublished),
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4. Access to the judicial system, particularly the role of lay partici-
pation in the courts.
5. The legitimacy of the pretransitional judicial system as stimulat-
ing or restraining the process of judicial transformation.
This Note first considers the popular aspirations of disenfranchised
South Africans which identify the judicial order as an area of concern
and importance, and provide the preconditions for a legitimate judicial
order in a future democratic South Africa. With these preconditions de-
fined, the Note discusses the status of the existing judicial order in South
Africa and focuses on the role of the courts and the apartheid legal order
in the maintenance and legitimization of the apartheid state. It will then
briefly discuss the experiences of transition in the legal orders following
political transformations in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. Fi-
nally, the Note will consider present and future possibilities for judicial
transformation in South Africa, in the light of the experiences of the peo-
ple's courts in South Africa during the 1984-1987 uprising and the his-
tory of judicial transformation in post-revolutionary Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, and Nicaragua.
II. A QUESTION OF LEGmITMACY: SOUTH AFRICA
For a judicial system to retain legitimacy, it must be seen not only to
perform the rites of judicial administration but also to enjoy the confi-
dence of the community it serves. In its role as arbitrator of both social
conflict and the distribution of resources, the judicial order must pro-
mote the community's interests and values. But the question of legiti-
macy is still more complex, because we must distinguish the status of
legitimacy from the process of legitimizing the existing social order.
The present judicial order is engaged in the process of legitimizing
South Africa's social order, applying and giving legalistic credibility to
the enforcement of apartheid laws. Despite the international commu-
nity's condemnation of the apartheid system as a crime against human-
ity,3 the existence of a nominally independent court system has given a
legal veneer to apartheid.
In contrast, the concept of popular justice, which guarantees com-
munity participation and promises the democratization of the judicial
process, suggests that it is possible for the judicial order to achieve the
status of legitimacy.
3. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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A. The Basis of a Future Legitimate Legal Order in South Africa
The Freedom Charter, adopted on June 26, 1955, by the Congress of
the People, at Kliptown, remains the most democratic expression of the
aspirations of the majority of South Africans.4 Launched by the Con-
gress Alliance in 1954, the Congress of the People was not a single event
but rather a series of discussions held in rallies, houses, and in street and
factory meetings throughout South Africa. Its climactic result was the
adoption of the Freedom Charter. Professor Z.K. Matthews proposed
the Congress of the People by calling for "a gathering to which ordinary
people will come, sent there by the people.... to draw up a blueprint for
the free South Africa of the future."5
One of the basic premises of the Freedom Charter is equality of all
South Africans. In its second clause, the Charter refers specifically to the
issue of equality before the law: "There shall be equal status in the bodies
of state, in the courts ... for all national groups and races."6 The fifth
clause of the Charter, entitled "All shall be equal before the law," refers
specifically to the judicial order:
No one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without a fair trial;
No one shall be condemned by the order of any Government official;
The courts shall be representative of all the people;
Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the people, and
shall aim at re-education, not vengence;
The police force and army shall be open to all on am equal basis and
shall be the helpers and protectors of the people;
All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or belief shall
be repealed.7
In addition to this specific reference to a future legal order, the Charter's
sixth clause guarantees that "[a]ll shall enjoy equal human rights:"
The law shall guarantee to all their right to speak, to organise, to meet
4. R. SUTTNER, THE FREEDOM CHARTER: THE PEOPLE'S CHARTER IN THE
NINETEEN-EIGHTIES, at 1 (1984).
5. Id. at 5.
6. The Freedom Charter, reprinted in SOCIALIST REV., Nov. - Dec. 1985, at 35-38. The
state's response to the Freedom Charter was to charge 156 leading democrats with treason,
based fundamentally on the Charter itself being a treasonable document. Ultimately charges
were withdrawn against all but 30 of the accused and in March 1961, the Special Criminal
Court set up to hear the case acquitted them. The Court held that the policy of the Congress
Alliance, including the Freedom Charter, had not been to overthrow the state by violence or to
replace the existing order with a dictatorship of the proletariat. R. SuTrNER, 30 YEARS Op
THE FREEDOM CHARTER 118-19 (1985).
7. The Freedom Charter, supra note 6, at 36.
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together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their
children;
The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law;
All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town,
from province to province, and from South Africa abroad;
Pass laws, permits and all other laws restricting these freedoms shall be
abolished.8
The significance of the Freedom Charter lies in the broad support it
currently enjoys among those struggling to end the apartheid system. De-
spite the apartheid regime's efforts to bury it by banning the document
for many years, in the 1980s the Freedom Charter has enjoyed wider
recognition and support than when it was first launched. In addition to
the African National Congress, which adopted the Freedom Charter as
its policy guide, the Charter has been formally adopted by both the
United Democratic Front, a coalition representing over 600 community
organizations, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the
largest trade union federation in the country's history. Although major-
ity rule will not come immediately, it is inevitable. Mass support for the
Freedom Charter suggests that it will probably be the guide for the im-
plementation of a majority rule government and social policy.
However, two questions with respect to the Freedom Charter re-
main. First, why do demands for a different kind of judicial order play so
large a part in the Freedom Charter? Second, what alternatives might a
newly created representative government consider when trying to imple-
ment the Freedom Charter's proposals? Before considering the alterna-
tives, it is necessary to understand why the present judicial order is
rejected by the majority of South Africans.
B. Illegitimacy of the Present Judicial Order
Judicial power, particularly in relation to other branches of the
state, lies in the judicial system's ability to mediate and reinforce existing
social relations within the society.9 Through its formal traditions and
function in society, the judiciary tends to enjoy greater prestige among
the populace than other branches of the state. 10 As a result, judicial in-
terpretations of events, conflicts, and solutions "have relatively greater
8. Id. at 37.
9. "The most pervasive ideological effect of South African law is that its rules and their
application give effect to existing social relations .... [T]he law has the effect not only of rein-
forcing these relations, but it also legitimises them in their existing form." Suttner, The Judici-
ary: Its Ideological Role in South Africa, 14 INT'L J. OF THE Soc. OF L. 47, 52 (1986).
10. Id. at 49.
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persuasive value or legitimating potential, than statements from the gov-
ernment itself."11
An essential component of this ability derives from the judiciary's
formal independence from other state structures, particularly the overtly
repressive structures such as the police and military, which intervene to
reinforce "law and order." 12 Judicial "independence" stems from the
formal grant of authority by the Consititution, which states in Subsection
68(1) that the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the Supreme
Court of South Africa,"a but derives its credibility and is reaffirmed by
each conflict between the judiciary and other branches of the state.
The South African judiciary however is not perceived as having un-
fettered independence. First, the constitutional grant of judicial power to
the Appellate Division, the highest division of the Supreme Court, is lim-
ited by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 'his doctrine provides
the basis for Subsection 68(2) of the 1983 Constitution which states that
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, provided in the Supreme Court
Act of 1959, is subject to the provisions of sections 18 and 34 of the
Constitution.14 These provisions restrict the court's "testing power,"
limiting the court's review of parliamentary legislation to a consideration
of whether there has been a violation of parliamentary procedure. 5 Sec-
ond, the composition of the judiciary 16 is significant in determining the
degree of autonomy the judiciary will be prepared to assert, particularly
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. S. AFR. CONST. Act 110, § 68(1) (1983); See also J. CLOETE, CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL
AND MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA 198 (1982). The present provision is iden-
tical to Subsection 94(1) of S. AFR. CONST. Act 32 (1961).
14. S. AFR. CONST. Act 110, § 68(2) (1983).
15. The courts can investigate and pronounce upon whether the Act's provisions have
been complied with in respect to any instrument purporting to be an Act of Parliament. They
may not investigate parliamentary rules and orders, nor a presidential certification. Substan-
tive review is explicitly excluded. L.J. BOULLE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND Tl
APARTHEID STATE: LEGITIMACY, CONSOCIATIONALISM AND CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA
203 (1984).
16. All of the approximately 130 superior court judges in South Africa are white. More-
over, no black person has been appointed to the Supreme Court bench since its creation in
1910, despite the fact that the Supreme Court Act itself places no prohibition on the appoint-
ment of blacks to judicial office. The appointment of Mr. Hassan Mall SC as an acting judgo of
the Natal Supreme Court for the month of February 1987 displayed the Natal bench's willing-
ness to have people of color participating in the judiciary. Mokgatle, The Exclusion of Blacks
from the South African Judicial System, 3 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 1, 45-47 (1987). However,
the transfer of Natal's Judge President, John Milne, and the earlier retirement of his acting
deputy, Judge Ray Leon, and their replacement by two judges who are not as partial to civil
liberties reduces the likelihood of any repeat of the above example. 3 Weekly Mail 51, Jan. 14,
1988, at 8.
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when this leads to conflict with other branches of the state.1 7 The execu-
tive branch's ability to alter the composition of the court, by increasing
the number of judges required to make up a quorum in particular mat-
ters, ensures that any significant conflict will generally be resolved in
favor of the executive."8
C. The Judicial Order as an Integral Part of the Apartheid State
The illegitimacy of the present judicial order in South Africa is best
understood within the wider context of apartheid in South Africa.
1. Specific Character of the South African State
Modem South African history is shaped by colonial domination and
the resulting "division of its peoples into dominant and subordinate
groups defined primarily by criteria of colour."19 In short,
civic status is determined at birth and for life by colour rather than
class, by genealogy rather than function; a person can move up or
down the social scale within... [their] primary colour group, but...
cannot transfer to another such group; functional categories cut across
the colour line, but members of one race cannot combine freely with
co-functionaries of another race.20
This does not mean, of course, that members of each racial classifi-
cation are homogeneous, for within each there are varying degrees of
class 21 differentiation.' Nevertheless, legal restrictions are based en-
tirely on racial classification.' These restrictions determine where blacks
17. See Corder, The Supreme Court Arena of Struggle?, in THE STATE OF APARTHEID 93
(W. James ed. 1987).
18. See infra notes 131-40, struggle over the removal of Africans and Coloureds from the
common voting roll.
19. Slovo, No Middle Road, in SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE NEW PoLrrcs OF REVOLUTION
103, 119 (B. Davidson, J. Slovo, & A. Wilkinson eds. 1976).
20. J. SIMONS & R. SIMONS, CLASS AND COLOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA 1850-1950, at 618
(1983) [hereinafter SIMONS].
21. Switching between different levels of abstraction often leads to confusion in the use of
concepts. The concept of class here should be understood to refer not merely to an individual's
relationship to the means of production but in the wider context of a class struggle. Thus Marx
argues that "separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common
battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competi-
tors." K. MARx, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, Part One, 82 (Lawrence and Wishart 1973); See
also, Wolpe, Towards an Analysis of the South African State, 8 INT'L J. OF THE SOC. OF L. 399,
412-13 (1980).
22. Wolpe, supra note 21, at 413.
23. See generally J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL OR-
DER 53-104 (1978); See also C. WEERAMANTRY, APARTHEID: THE CLOSING PHASES? 166-76
(1980).
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can live, work, and attend school. Thus, "[e]xplicit provisions in the law
and state-backed social practice have ensured that whilst not every white
is a full member of the ruling class proper, no black, whatever... [their]
economic status, can participate on equal terms with ... [their] white
equivalent at any level of the social structure."24
In "white-designated25 South Africa" there exist all the features of
an advanced capitalist state. But, South Africa also displays all the fea-
tures of a "colony." 26 A highly industrialized economy coexists with -
indeed, it could be said to depend on - scattered rural labour reserves,
whose residents suffer severe overcrowding and social dislocation while
these reserves are artificially maintained and consolidated by the
apartheid Bantustan policy. 7
Politically, the white minority has exercised power through a
Westminister-type parliamentary democracy. 28 The black majority has
been denied basic political rights of every kind. South Africa is conven-
tionally treated as a legitimate state, whose colonial status disappeared
with the passage of the South Africa Act and the establishment of the
Union of South Africa in 1910,29 or with the granting of Dominion Sta-
24. Slovo, supra note 19, at 119.
25. The distinction between "white South Africa" and "black South Africa" is of course
merely legalistic:
The country has in fact advanced well beyond the limits of a primitive colonial.
ism.... Africans are allowed to acquire a permanent domicile and landed property
in barely more than one-tenth of the surface area. They depend wholly or largely on
what they earn in the remaining nine-tenths which have been declared 'the white
man's country.' This is the developed sector, containing virtually all the mines,
farms, factories, towns, ports, railways and strategic centres, and could be equated
with an imperial state. But it is 'white' only in terms of proprietary rights and polit-
ical authority. Black and brown people outnumber the whites in almost every town
and rural district.
SIMoNs, supra note 20, at 611.
26. Slovo, supra note 19, at 133.
27. Bantustans are those areas, comprising 13% of the land in South Africa, which were
set aside as black reserves under the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. See generally L. PLATZKY &
C. WALKER, THE SURPLUS PEOPLE: FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 70-127 (1985).
28. The implementation of the new tri-cameral Parliament under the 1983 Constitution in
fact had the effect of "disenfranchising" the white electorate and placing power in the hands of
the executive president. The establishment of Regional Services Councils and the National
Security Management system has continued this trend towards executive power as well as
creating a significant role for the military and appointed committees in political decision
making.
29. South Africa Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, Cap.9, made provision for the establishment of the
Union. Its establishment on May 31, 1910, was in terms of a Royal Proclamation of December
2, 1909.
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tus by the 1931 Statute of Westminster. ° In fact black South Africans
retain a subject, or colonial, status under a state which represents only
the white minority.31 The South Africa Act in 1910 failed to extend the
franchise, based on property and educational qualifications, that was en-
joyed by the Cape colony's black voters. Instead, it removed their right
to be elected to Parliament and entrenched the racially exclusive consti-
tutions of the other three provinces.3 By denying all blacks the right to
freely chosen representation, the South Africa Act institutionalized and
statutorily defined black South Africans as a subordinate category of per-
sons within their own country.33
2. The Racial Basis of the Judicial Order in South Africa
To understand how the judicial order functions with respect to the
majority of South Africans, it is necessary to outline the statutory struc-
ture that the apartheid system has created. This structure can be sepa-
rated into three broad areas: general apartheid legislation, legislation
establishing the administrative regime which controls the lives of black
residents in the urban areas, and legislation providing for establishment
of the bantustans.
General apartheid legislation defines racial groups and provides for
their separation into distinct geographical areas.34 It is this body of legis-
lation which gives rise to the "special" legal system regulating the lives of
the black majority. Thus in one circumstance South African law treats a
black person as a regular "subject in law," which implies juridical equal-
ity.a5 For the purposes of the law of contract, for example, all South
Africans are equal, and thus "the notion of surface equality... [coexists]
with an unacknowledged substantial inequality and capacity to
coerce."
36
Similarly, for the purposes of criminal law, blacks are treated as or-
dinary South African subjects. However, these "universal" qualities of
30. Statute of Westminster, 1931, reprinted in E. OsMARczyK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 914 (1985).
31. Theodoropoulos, The Decolonization Approach to the Eradication of Apartheid, 18
INT. L. & PoL 899, 914 (1986).
32. ARucAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, Apartheid South Africa: Colonialism of a Special
Type (undated pamphlet).
33. Id.
34. W. HOSTEN, A. EDWARDS, C. NATHAN & F. BOSMAN, INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 658 (rev. reprint 1983) [hereinafter HOSTEN].
35. See Suttner, supra note 9, at 53-55.
36. See Judge Kuper's rejection of the significance of the financial standing or status of
individuals in the application of the law. De Beers v. Minister of Mines, Judgment of Judge
Kuper, quoted in Suttner, supra note 9, at 54.
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the common law37 are undermined by both the existence of patently ra-
cist laws and the discriminatory prosecution and penalization of offend-
ers."8 In particular circumstances, the criminal law specifically
constitutes one section of the community, Africans as "Blacks," as a con-
dition for criminality. This is so because a person cannot be accused of
certain crimes, such as residing outside of a bantustan without permis-
sion, unless he or she falls into a particular racial category, in this case,
unless he or she is "Black." 39
In contrast to the administration of the criminal law, civil law cases
between Africans fall alternatively under the "formal" civil law system
or one or more "customary" legal systems." The application of African
customary law involves a further metamorphosis of racial categories.
The question of whether to apply any specific formi of customary law is
determined by the status of a person, first as a particular racial subject
and second as a particular tribal subject.4" Despite this formalistic and
convoluted process of definition, the customary law applied by the com-
missioners' courts (in 1984 the magistrate's courts took over the jurisdic-
tion of the commissioners' courts outside the bantustans) was merely a
shadow of its precolonial "customary" self.42
A second category of apartheid legislation consists of the more spe-
cific legislation which controls the administration of "Black and other
nonwhite persons" who live or are employed in the urban areas, or areas
37. Hunt argues that the universality of the application of laws is an essential legitimizing
factor. Certain minimum levels of social protection, particularly laws "relating to offences
against the person whose universalism manifests itself in the apparent protection, or at least
retribution offered to all citizens ... plays an important role in delineating legitimate and
illegitimate forms of coercion." Quoted in Suttner, supra note 9, at 54.
38. Id.; See generally A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1973).
39. Suttner, supra note 9, at 55.
40. See Suttner, The Social and Ideological Function of African Customary Law in South
Africa, 11 Soc. DYNAMICS 1, 49-51 (1984).
41. Id. at 50-52.
42. A. Seidman and R. Seidman identify two major trends in the metamorphosis of cus.
tomary law during the colonial era and make a primary distinction between settler and non-
settler colonies. In the settler colonies, including South Africa and Zimbabwe, the coloniallsts
used legal compulsions to drive Africans into migratory labor patterns and white employment.
Head or poll taxes and marketing and pricing laws drove Africans out of the commercial
farming sector, while land tenure laws deprived Africans of land, In the export enclaves of
West Africa, on the 6ther hand, the British warped customary law, not to produce a subsis-
tence economy, but to produce more cash crops. After thirty-odd years of litigation the British
courts transformed West African customary land law, which made land basically inalienable.
They interpreted customary law as making the land alienable and thus suitable to the impera-
tives of capitalist production and tree crops. A. Seidman & R. Sc:idman, The Political Econ-
omy of Customary Law in the Former British Territories of Africa, 28 J. OF AFR. L, 10, 13-18
(1984).
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considered part of "white South Africa"."3 The 1923 Black (Urban Ar-
eas) Act sought to control the number of black South Africans living in
the 87 percent" of South Africa designated as "white."4  Through a
combination of strict supervision of employment in "proclaimed areas"
and "measures designed to secure the 'removal' of the unemployed and
those considered to be idle, dissolute or disorderly," the Act restricted
the movement of Africans in white-designated areas. 4  In 1952, the 1945
Urban Areas Act,47 which replaced earlier statutes, was amended to in-
troduce a new Section 10 placing a general statutory prohibition on any
Africans remaining for more than 72 hours in "white" areas.48 Exempt
from this provision are those who remain South African citizens and who
qualify - in terms of Sections 10(l)(a) and (b) of the Urban Areas Act
- as "permanent residents" of the urban areas. But severe restrictions
limit the "freedom of permanent residents to be educated and to reside
(with or without family), to work, worship and play;" such activities
often require the prior approval of the authorities.49
One commentator who describes the legal regime governing the lives
of urban Africans as "essentially a system of government by administra-
tion and not by law," identifies the following factors as constituting this
administrative regime:
a) the large degree to which regulation of urban Africans' lives is
sought through the delegation of wide discretionary powers to public
officials to grant or withdraw approval for a range of day-to-day
activities;
b) the degree of flexibility in the allocation of functions within the
state administration;
43. HOSTEN, supra note 34, at 658.
44. The 1913 and 1936 Land Acts set aside 13% of the total area of the country for 73%
of the population. The remaining 87% of the land was henceforth reserved for whites. L
PLATZKY & C. WALKER, THE SURPLUS PEOPLE: FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 92
(1985).
45. Dean, The Legal Regime Governing Urban Africans in South Africa -An Administra-
live-Law Perspective, in URBAN BLACK LAW 105 (Bennet, Dean, Hutchison, Leeman & van
Zyl Smit eds. repub. from Acta Juridica 1984).
46. Id.
47. Act 25 of 1945.
48. Dean, supra note 45, at 106.
49. Id.
Apart from the restrictions on residence and employment, these flow principally
from: § 9 of the 1945 Urban Areas Act (segregation of and restrictions on the use of
facilities outside locations), the Reservation of Seperate Amenities Act 49 of 1953
and the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 (restrictions on the use of facilities generally),
and § 72 of the Liquor Act 87 of 1977 (segregation on licensed premises).
Id. at 106 n.20.
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c) the degree to which policy can be developed and implemented in-
formally; and
d) the degree to which the whole system is subject to centralised
control.50
This system regulates urban Africans' lives, not through the applica-
tion of legal "rights," defined by rules of general application and en-
forced by independent tribunals, but through the grant of broad
discretionary powers to administrative officials.51 The black community
has often challenged the authoritarian nature of this system. However,
the courts, either through paternalistic racism or simply refusing to ac-
knowledge the political realities of South Africa, have upheld the chal-
lenged regulations on the grounds that "[t]he local authority is the best
judge of what is, as a matter of policy, necessary or most desirable in and
for the governance of its own area, and it is representative of the people
in that area."52 Obviously this analysis ignores the fact that the "people
to whom this regulation applied were not represented by the local au-
thority,"53 which was made up of appointed white bureaucrats.
In the early 1980s, the apartheid regime claimed it was going to
establish local authorities in the urban black townships and attempted to
impose designated councillors. 54 Within months of the September 1984
uprising, all but three of the "puppet" councils had been destroyed and
the townships increasingly became ungovernable. 55 The declaration of a
State of Emergency saw the official "administration" of the townships
placed back in the hands of appointed officials, who worked closely with
the military through a new system of local Joint Management Centers. 56
Local residents rejected state interference and attempted to establish al-
ternative political and administrative structures."
Bantustan legislation, the third category of apartheid legislation,
regulates the "separate development of the Black nations" in the roughly
thirteen percent5 8 of the country that has been specially demarcated for
this purpose.59 Since the passage of the Promotion of Black Self-govern-
50. Id. at 115.
51. Id. at 123.
52. R. v. Seedat 1957 (1) SA 27 (N), quoted in Dean, supra note 45, at 121.
53. Id. at 121.
54. These councils were established in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1983.
See S. DAvis, APARTHEID'S REBELS 89 (1987).
55. Id. at 89-92. For information on the September 1984 uprising, see infra notes 206-14
and accompanying text.
56. See, Black Sash, The Creeping Coup, SASH, May 1987, at 3.
57. See S. DAVIS, supra note 54, at 90-91.
58. PLAKTSKY & WALKER, supra note 44, at 92.
59. HOSTEN, supra note 34, at 658.
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ment Act of 1959,1 small sections of the country have been set aside for
Africans to exercise their political aspirations. This process, referred to
by the apartheid regime as the policy of "separate development,"61 has
already led to the creation of four "independent" bantustans and aims to
engineer a permanent balkanization of the country62 - and, coinciden-
tally, the judicial system. The process of judicial balkanization is demon-
strated by the legislative process that led to the creation of the
"independent" bantustan of the Transkei, and to the concurrent detach-
ment of the courts in that region of the country from the existing judicial
system.
Implementation of the Promotion of Black Self-government Act be-
gan with the passage of the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963.63 This
process was extended by the Black States Constitution Act of 1971.1
The Transkei Constitution Act and the "independence" of the Transkei
bantustan in 197665 served as the prototype of what government spokes-
men consider a process that is "in form and timing comparable to Afri-
can decolonization." 66  Section 48(1) of the Transkei Constitution
60. Id. at 664.
61. Id. at 667.
62. For an early critique of the policy of separate development and the idea of bantustan
development, see G. MBEKi, SouTH AnuRcA: THE PEASANTS' REVOLT 73-94 (2d. ed. 1984).
63. Act 48 of 1963.
64. HosTEN, supra note 34, at 665.
65. Id. at 666-67.
66. M. VORSTER, M. WIECHERS & D. vAN VUUREN, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF TRANS-
KEi, BOPHUTHATSWANA, VENDA AND CISKEI 15 (1985). It is clear, from the comparison
made between the process of "separate development" under apartheid and the process of
decolonization that the British implemented in Africa, that the South African Government has
attempted to legitimize this process of bulkanization by following the British decolonization
model in form if not in content. A comparison is made, between the following stages of
decolonization and "seperate development":
BRITISH COLONIAL SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT
The Crown is head of state acting on the The state president is head of state, acting
advice of the British government on the advice of the RSA government
British legislation has preference above South African parliamentry legislation has
colonial legislation preference above laws of the legislative
assemblies
Development stages: Development stages:
Crown colony Territorial authority
Representative Government Legislative assembly of responsibly
governed territory
Responsible self-government Self-governing territory within the RSA
Dominium Pre-independence "national state"
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provides for all existing courts to continue.67 In addition, Section 48(2)
gave the Transkei's Minister of Justice the power to establish and dises-
tablish magistrates or commissioners' courts and appoint judicial
officers.68
The South African State President 69 granted the bantustan a high
court in 1973;70 nevertheless, the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of South Africa remained the ultimate court of appeal, even after
the Transkei was granted formal "independence" in 1976.71 In 1979, the
Transkei bantustan established its own Appellate Division through an
amendment to the Transkei Constitution,72 and removed the right of ap-
peal to the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court."
The Transkei Regional Authority Act 13 of 198271 created a new
level of courts in the bantustan, which have been sanctioned by the judi-
ciary despite serious questions surrounding their purpose and function."7
The new courts have the same status as magistrates courts but are based
on the retention of the chiefs and tribalism, with all proceedings to be in
accordance with the traditional laws and customs of the region76 as con-
strued by officials owing their positions to the continued existence of the
apartheid system.
3. Exclusion From the "Colonial" State: The Foundation of the
Present Judicial Order
The most striking feature of the South African state remains its ra-
cial compartmentalization and exclusion. Preliminary 1985 census
figures estimated the population of South Africa, divided into the four
major racial categories recognized under the apartheid system, as
Id.
By this analogy of form rather than substance, the apartheid government seems to be
attempting not only to justify the process of bantustanization, but also to buttress the question
of the legitimacy of the "independence" the white minority assumed with the passage of the
Statute of Westminster in 1931 and the creation of Dominium status.
67. Act 48 of 1963; see also, W. HOSTEN, supra note 34, at 676.
68. HOSTEN, supra note 34, at 676.
69. Id.; "The state president had the power to constitute a high court for Transkei to take
over the jurisdiction of any provincial or local division of the supreme court of South Af-
a.. . ." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. C. VOSLOO, INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 2
(Supp. 1984).
73. Id.
74. Transkei Regional Authority Act 13 of 1982.
75. Beck, Tribal Justice in Transkei, 1 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 260 (1985).
76. Id. at 261-62.
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21,197,253 Africans (72%); 4,590,639 whites (15.6%); 2,853,964
coloureds (9.7%) and 801,758 Asians (2.7%)."n Although whites make
up only one-sixth of the population, they hold all positions of authority
in state structures.78 Yet these figures do not provide us with more than
a superficial insight into the interests the state represents. In his analysis
of the relationship between class and state, Harold Wolpe suggests that
the relationship between class79 and political power8 ° provides a basis for
understanding the particular form the state, and the judiciary as a partic-
ular branch of the state, has taken in South Africa."'
a. Access or exclusion on the basis of race
Wolpe concludes in part that "the materialization of class powers in
the apparatuses of the state is expressed in the limitation of access or
77. SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1985,
at 2 (1986) [hereinafter RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1985].
78. See generally S. GREENBERG, LEGITIMATING THE ILLEGITIMATE: STATE, MAR-
KETS AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1987).
79. Analyzing class in this context, Wolpe develops an understanding of class as a social
force. He argues:
the unity of a class as a social force, has to be 'constructed' through the articulations
and unification of the organisational form in which that class exists... [and thus] the
relationship between the organisations through which a class exists inside the state
apparatuses (as a political party or otherwise) and outside of those apparatuses (for
example, in a branch of production) cannot be conceived of in instrumental terms,
but must be seen as a relationship of articulation or disarticulation. This means that a
shorter or longer term unity may come into existence between say, state forms of
organisation of a class and other, non-state forms of organisation of the same class
and in this restricted sense it is possible to talk of the political representation of the
interests of a fraction of a class. But that representation is the outcome of class strug-
gles and is dependent on the balance of forces; it is not given.
Wolpe, supra note 21, at 413.
80. Wolpe cites Poulantzas, arguing that:
all power exists 'only in so far as it is materialized in certain apparatuses' and, in this
sense, state apparatuses... are no more appendages of power, but play a role in its
constitution.... As such it is necessary to concieve ... of the capitalist state as a
relation, as being structurally shot through and constituted with and by class contra-
dictions, (and this) means firmly grasping the fact that an institution (the state) ...
cannot really be a monolithic fissureless bloc, but is itself, by virtue of its very struc-
ture (the State is a relation), divided. The various organs and branches of the State
(ministries and government offices, executive and parliament, central administration
and local and regional authorities, army, judiciary etc.) reveal major contradictions
among themselves, each of them frequently constituting the seat and the representa-
tive - in short, the crystallization - of this or that fraction of the power bloc, this
or that specific and competing interest.
N. Poulantzas, The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau, 95 NEw LmEr REVIEW
75 (1976), quoted in Wolpe, supra note 21, at 413-14.
81. Id.
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exclusion from the state of particular classes.... 2 In South Africa,
access to and exclusion from the state apparatus must be understood in
terms of the categories of black and white subjects.8 3 The category of the
subject "refers here to the qualities, rights, obligations, disabilities which
are attributed to and hence constitute agents placed in specific institu-
tional and organisational matrices." 4
Although law plays a central role in this process, the delineation of
specific categories of black and white subjects must be seen as the out-
come of class conflicts and social conflicts within differentiated but inter-
connected spheres of the social formation. 5 But this is not a static
model of inclusion and exclusion, for "[t]he access of classes or elements
of classes to state apparatuses such that these apparatuses become the
means of defining and organising the interests or those fractions of
classes, quite obviously depends on the outcome of struggles which take
place in already given structured political and economic conditions." 6
These considerations have an obvious relevance to an analysis of the
South African judiciary as a particular branch of the state, "since the
operation of mechanisms of exclusion from and access to the state appa-
ratuses have here taken a particular form [i.e., on the basis of race] and
have had far reaching consequences. 8 7
The contrast between the access granted to certain economic inter-
ests and the exclusion of blacks from judicial posts is demonstrated most
vividly in the special court of income tax appeals, established when tax-
payers are dissatisfied with decisions of the Commissioner for Inland
Revenue. 8 This court consists of "a judge.., an accountant.., and a
representative of the commercial community: Provided that in all cases
relating to the business of mining such third member shall if the appel-
lant so desires be a qualified mining engineer." 89 The provision that the
third member of this special court of income tax appeals may, at the
appellant's desire, be either a qualified mining engineer or a representa-
tive of the commercial community is an obvious example of the access of
the commercial and mining sectors to state structures, particularly to
those structures bearing directly upon their interests. The access to the
court system granted to representatives of commercial and mining capi-
82. Id. at 414.
83. Id. at 417.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 416.
87. Id. at 417.
88. J. CLOETE, supra note 13, at 201.
89. Id.
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tal stands in stark contrast to the lack of representation given to the
black majority.
b. Formation and transformation of racial categories
The categories of white and black have been continuously formed
and transformed through this century.90 The Natal colony (on the east
coast of South Africa) at the turn of the century provides an interesting
example of this process. Following the defeat of the Zulu Kingdom in
the late nineteenth century, and the importation of Indian indentured
labor to work on the sugar plantations, the population of Natal was di-
vided into three major groups: the vast majority of the population who
were members of the recently defeated Zulu Kingdom;91 recently-arrived
indentured workers from India who were distinguished from other mem-
bers of the society not only by their legal status as indentured labor, but
also by their different language, religion, and cultural traditions;92 and
all other members of the colonial society who were defined as "Euro-
pean," more because they were persons outside the first two categories
than as a separate racial category in itself. For example, prison regula-
tions divided the prison population into "Africans," "Indians," and
"Europeans," but black Americans or French creoles were considered
European.93 In reality these categories were premised on major political,
cultural and economic distinctions within the society rather than on
purely racial categories.
Throughout South Africa's history the process of racial categoriza-
tion has never been frozen. A striking example of the fluidity of racial
categories, in terms even of the formal system of racial classification, is
the yearly reclassification of individuals among all racial categories.94 In
1985, 1,167 race reclassifications were formally reported in the Hansard,
the official publication of the South African Parliament."
In the 1960s and 1970s the implementation of the apartheid policy
of "separate development" further transformed the definition of "racial
subjects" as the regime sought to emphasize "tribal" distinctions among
Africans.96 The new "tribal" categorization was expressed legally in
90. Wolpe, supra note 21, at 418.
91. For an account of the defeat of the Zulu state, see N. PARSONS, A NEW IMToRY OF
SOUTHERN AFmCA 153-58 (1982).
92. Id. at 186.
93. The definition of "Europeans" included "all persons of European descent, Eurasians
... American Negroes, French Creoles and West Indians." A. SACHS, supra note 38, at 89.
94. RACE RELATIONS SuRVEY 1985, supra note 77, at 3.
95. Id.
96. Suttner points out that such statutory criminal law as the pass laws (and now other
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bantustan constitution Acts, through legislation purporting to create "in-
dependent" tribal states and "Bantu" education legislation. "Tribal"
categorization is also one of the functions of the special legal and court
system governing civil relations between Africans. 97
Since the Soweto uprising in 1976, the apartheid regime has started
a process of controlled reform which has included an increasing reconsti-
tution and transformation of these categories. New distinctions have also
been created between that part of the black community that is included
in the tricameral parliamentary system,98 those considered "urban
blacks" who are presently being offered a political voice through an advi-
sory national council, and the vast majority of Africans, those who are
denationalized and reconstituted as aliens - citizens of one or another
"independent" bantustan.99
The constant reconstitution of these categories is part of the state's
attempts to regulate growing tensions within the society.lc ° Since the
mid-1970s the state has gradually begun to allow some parts of the black
population limited access to the state apparatuses.101 This process of
limited change within the existing system is controlled by state repres-
sion, most evident in the widespread attempt to demobilize popular
resistance in the 1980s.10 2
D. Judicial Structure and Function in South Africa
Despite its clearly racial character, the South African regime contin-
ues to point to the Supreme Court as proof of the government's commit-
ment to a Westminster-style democracy. For instance when State
forms of influx control) constitutes Africans as 'Blacks' and therefore potentially liable for
offences that do not apply to 'non-Blacks.' Generally the law does not differentiate between
specific 'tribal' categories, with the exception of the bantustan system which specifically makes
distinctions on the basis of 'tribal' categories. See Suttner, supra note 9, at 55.
97. Id.
98. The Indian and Coloured communities have been included in the 1983 Constitution.
See Mar6, The New Constitution: Extending Democracy or Decentralizing Control? in SOUT1l
AFRICAN REViEW III, at 217-18 (1986).
99. See Wolpe, supra note 21, at 418, who argues that, nonctheless, it is important to
recognize that the category of black subject gives the popular masses access to particular state
apparatuses (bantustans etc.) as forms of the organization of these masses and therefore poten-
tial sites of mass struggles.
100. Davis, Repression and Integration: Two Sides of the Same Apparatus, 15 INT'L J. OF
THE SOC. OF L. 61, 76-78 (1987). Wolpe argues that the category of the black subject provides
a condition for exclusion but "at the same time a condition of access to certain particular types
of state apparatuses ... [which] provide, by the nature of their structure and the forms of
access to them, sites of mass struggles". Wolpe supra note 21, at 418.
101. Davis, supra note 100, at 76-78.
102. Id. at 78-80.
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President P.W. Botha announced the appointment of a judge to chair a
commission of inquiry into a 1985 police massacre of African civilians,
he quoted a Supreme Court judge as saying that "[t]he courts of this
country have for over a century acted fairly and independently and hon-
estly, and independently of improper influence. They do so today, and
will do so in future.... In this regard the courts of no other country
surpass our courts and very, very few equal them."103
However, the Court's independence must be viewed in light of the
State President's power to appoint, and to determine the number of
judges who will make up the court."° Section 3(1) of the Supreme Court
Act No. 59 of 1959 provides that the State President "may appoint as
many judges of appeal as the State President may from time to time de-
termine."' 1 5 In the early 1980s, a judge told a state commission he was
concerned about the growing power of the Department of Justice over
the Supreme Court Bench,"°a which he said resulted from the belief that
the Department of Justice has "a weighty vote on appointments to and
promotions within the judiciary."107
The final report of the Hoexter Commission"'8 recognized that the
mode of appointment of judges presented a serious problem and held that
"the administration of justice and public confidence in the bench could
be prejudiced if there were room for gossip about the independence of
those elevated to the bench."' t" The Commission admitted another ap-
pointment-related threat to the "independence" of the judiciary when it
responded to the charge that only a small group of judges in the Trans-
vaal preside in criminal trials involving state security." 0 This practice
103. Marcus, Respect for the Court" Myth and Reality, 3 S. AFRa J. ON Hurt. RTs. 1, 236
(1987).
104. This is particularly true when Judges have security of tenure as a mechanism of main-
taining the independence of the judiciary. Subsection 10(7) of the Supreme Court Act No.59
of 1959 states that: "The Chief Justice, a judge of appeal or any other judge of the Supreme
Court shall not be removed from office except by... Parliament in the same session praying
for such removal on the ground of misbehavior or incapacity."
105. See also, J. CLOETE, supra note 13, at 199.
106. Section 69 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 provides that
"All administrative powers, duties and functions affecting the administration ofjustice shall be
under the control of the Minister of Justice."
107. Kahn, The Didcott Memorandum and other Submissions to the Hoexter Commission,
97 S. AFR. L. J. 659 (1981). See also FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSrrY OF THE WMVA .RS-
RAND, ANNUAL SURVEY OF SouTH AFRICAN LAW 1984, at 659 [hereinafter ANNuAL SUR-
VEY 1984].
108. The Hoexter Commission was established by the government in 1979 to investigate
the structure and functioning of the courts. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
109. ANNUAL SURVEY 1984, supra note 107, at 580.
110. Id.
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engendered fears that only judges who were sympathetic to government
polices and prepared to hand down stiff sentences were appointed to
these cases. Recognizing the threat to legitimacy this practice posed, the
Commission noted that "it is in the interests of the proper administration
of justice that, so far as may be practicable, an attempt should be made to
achieve an even distribution of such work among all the available
judges."111
1. Supreme Court
The formal authority of the Appellate Division, the highest branch
of the Supreme Court, is exercised through the effect of its judgments and
orders, which are binding on the provincial and local divisions of the
Supreme Court and magistrates' courts.1 12
In addition there are a number of functional courts, including the
Water Courts and of more recent vintage, the Industrial Court. 113
Although trade unions have managed to achieve significant victories over
management in the Industrial Court, the position of the judicial officer as
an appointee of the Minister of Manpower ensures that, in arbitrating
between the interests of capital and labor, the court will nevertheless re-
main within the confines of overall state strategy.
At the request of an attorney general, special Superior Courts may
be constituted by the State President to arraign an accused on a charge
relating to state security or the maintenance of public order.114 This pro-
vision is used to remove trials of antiapartheid activists away from areas
where the activists enjoy popular support.115 Apart from making it diffi-
cult for family and friends to attend the proceedings, the isolation of the
111. FIFTH AND FINAL REPORT OF THE HOEXTER COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE COURTS (RP78/1983).
112. J. CLOETE, supra note 13, at 199. In January 1982 there were six provincial divisions,
each made up of a "Judge president and as many puisine judges as the State President may
from time to time determine on the basis of the volume of work." In addition there are three
local divisions in areas of major population concentration and commercial activity. There are
also Circuit local divisions and itinerant courts which are constituted by the Judge President of
the provincial division within whose area of jurisdiction these courts function.
113. The Water Courts have jurisdiction regarding the use, diversion or appropriation of
public water, J. CLOETE, supra note 13, at 201. The Industrial Court established in terms of
the Industrial Conciliation Act is a functional court that deals with labour disputes. It is pre-
sided over by an appointee of the Minister of Manpower with the right of appeal to the appro.
priate provincial division of the Supreme Court or in the case of It reserved question of law,
directly to the Appellate Division, in 6 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, 507-08
(1985).
114. Id. at 200-01.
115. Suttner, Political Trials and the Legal Process, in SOUTH A'FRICAN REVIEW II, 63, 68
(1984).
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accused from his or her communities makes it less likely that the court
proceedings will become the site of popular demonstrations in support of
the accused.'
16
a. Formal limits ofjudicial power
Over a long period the judiciary in South Africa enjoyed considera-
ble autonomy, "inscribed [at the level of law] not only in the constitu-
tional guarantees of independence... but also in the procedures and
modes of proof laid down in the Judges' Rules, 1 7 Criminal Procedure
Act, etc." 118
The court's power of judicial review is restricted by the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignity which is enshrined in the Constitution. Sec-
tion 34 states that "no court of law shall be competent to inquire into or
pronounce upon the validity of an Act of Parliament."'1 9 This constitu-
tional rejection of judicial review needs to be understood as a product of
the historical development of the judicial order in South Africa. The
creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 brought together four colo-
nies (Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal), each with a differ-
ent judicial tradition. The constitution adopted by the Orange Free State
colony in 1854, for example, created a nonsovereigu Volksraad (legisla-
ture) and guaranteed the rights of peaceful assembly and petition, equal-
116. In order to further isolate the accused, often political leaders and activists, the regime
passed a law making it illegal to demonstrate in the vacinity of court buildings. See id. at 71.
117. The Supreme Court Act No.59 of 1959 makes provision for the Rules of Court to be
under the control of the judiciary.
Section 43(1) states: "The Chief Justice and the judges of appeal may... make rules for
regulating the conduct of the proceedings ...."
Section 43(3)(b) defines the scope of this rule making power and significantly includes the
power to determine, "the process of the courts."
118. Wolpe, supra note 21, at 419.
119. RSA Const. Act 110, Part IV, § 34(3), 1983. Section 34(2)(a) allows a very limited
review, stating:
Any division of the Supreme Court of South Africa shall, subject to the provisions of
section 18, be competent to inquire into and pronounce upon the question as to
whether the provisions of this Act are complied with in connection with any law
which is expressed to be enacted by the State President and Parliament or by the
State President and any House.
Section 18, in turn prevents judicial inspection of the State President's decision to declare
any particular issue a matter of general affairs or own affairs, distinctions which determine
whether a particular issue is referred to one of the ethnically based tricameral houses or
whether it is handled by the white dominated parliament as a whole. The provision states that
no court of law shall be competent to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of a
decision of the State President that matters mentioned in the decision are own affairs
of a population group, or are not own affairs of a population group, as the case may
be.
19881
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
ity before the law(for white settlers only),120 and the right to property.
Although the 1854 Constitution made no provision for a Supreme Court,
when one was established in 1876 its power of judicial review was ac-
cepted as an inherent feature of the Constitution.' 21
In the South African Republic (Transvaal colony), on the other
hand, the High Court's struggle for the power of judicial review precipi-
tated a major political crisis resulting in the High Court's adjournment
and finally the dismissal of the Chief Justice. 122 Swearing in a new Chief
Justice, President Kruger warned that the "testing right is a prin6iple of
the Devil," and advised the judges not to follow the Devil who had intro-
duced the testing right into Paradise and tested God's word. 123
Neither the Cape nor Natal colonies had judicial review. Their de-
velopment toward a parliamentary system of government, with a sover-
eign legislature that can pass practically any bill and amend the
Constitution by simple majority vote,' 24 traces its origins from the period
of British occupation of the Cape in 1806 and the commencement of
English legal influence on South African law. 125
When the National Convention 12 6 drafted a constitution for the
Union of South Africa in 1908, the prevailing tradition of legislative sov-
ereignty in three of the four provinces militated against the enshrinement
of the power of judicial review in the Union. This tendency was rein-
forced by the delegates' antipathy to the British Colonial Law Validity
Act of 1865,127 which overshadowed local legislative power by invalidat-
ing any law repugnant to imperial legislation.'28
The British Parliament passed the South Africa Act in 1909, creat-
ing the Union Parliament in 1910. This body remained subject to the
control of Westminster until the 1931 Statute of Westminster withdrew
120. But, the equality before the law provision was to be read in accordance with the morcs
of the Voortrekkers which accepted some people as more equal than others with race playing a
significant role in this determination. J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN
LEGAL ORDER 19 (1978).
121. Id.
122. Davidson, The History of Judicial Oversight of Legislative and Executive Action In
South Africa. 8 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 687, 697 (1985).
123. J. DUGARD, supra note 120, at 24.
124. Davidson, supra note 122, at 688.
125. J. DUGARD, supra note 120, at 16. British rule also brought the concept of the Rule of
Law with its insistence on access to courts of law and on equalty before the law, leading to the
establishment of a judicial system. Id at 17.
126. See id. at 25-28.
127. See id. at 28.
128. See generally Davidson, supra note 122, at 698-99 and J. DUGARD, supra note 120, at
25-28.
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South Africa from under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Laws Validity
Act. The courts then created by the Union of South Africa lacked any
formal power of judical review, except for the "testing right." 12 9
b. Conflicts with other state structures
Granted, the demise of judicial review from its enshrined position in
the Orange Free State Constitution of 1854 to its rejection by the Na-
tional Convention of 1908130 represented a limitation of judicial power.
The Supreme Court was, however, initially able to use the more limited
"testing right" to reject legislation and to engage in struggles against po-
sitions pressed for by other branches of the state. This was particularly
true with regard to the entrenched clauses of the Constitution. 131 De-
spite the Court's refusal to accept jurisdiction in the case of Ndlwana v.
Hofmeyer,132 by invoking the doctrine of parliamentry sovereignty, the
judiciary did an about face in Harris v. Minister of the Interior.33 In
Harris the Supreme Court rejected the Separate Representation of Voters
Act 46 of 1951 - which extended the process of disenfranchisement -
and thereby refused to sanction the removal of coloured voters from the
common roll.
The government responded with the High Court of Parliament
Act134 providing that any judgment of the Appellate Division that invali-
dated an Act of Parliament would be reviewed by the Parliament itself,
sitting as the High Court of Parliament. However, this Act too was
struck down by the courts.1 35 Despite increased support at the polls, the
government was unable to muster the two-thirds majority of both houses
of Parliament required by the Constitution to remove an entrenched
clause.
The government then embarked on a process that included packing
both the Senate (the upper house of Parliament) and the Supreme
Court. 1 36 The Appellate Division Quorum Act137 and Senate Act 38 al-
129. The right to question the validity of an act of Parliament on the grounds that its
passage did not comply with the procedure or form dictated by the constitution. See Davidson,
supra note 122, at 706-11.
130. Id. at 688.
131. Wolpe, supra note 21, at 419.
132. N.O., 1937 A.D. 229. A case in which a Mr. Ndlwana challenged his removal from
the common voters' roll in the Cape under the Representation of Natives Act, No.12 of 1936.
133. 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.). See Davidson, supra note 122, at 713 and 3. DUGARD, supra
note 120, at 29.
134. Act 35 of 1952.
135. J. DUGARD, supra note 120, at 30-31.
136. Id. at 31.
137. Act 27 of 1955.
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lowed the government to appoint judges and senalors sympathetic to its
proposed constitutional changes, thus facilitating the passage of the
South Africa Amendment Act of 1956.139 This had the effect of
revalidating the 1951 Separate Representation of Voters Act.140
South Africa's withdrawal from the British Commonwealth and a
new republican constitution 141 passed in 1961 abolished the last vestiges
of judicial review. Section 59 of the new constitution entrenched parlia-
mentary sovereignty by providing that "no court of law shall be compe-
tent to enquire into or to pronounce upon the validity of any Act passed
by Parliament."' 42
c. Judiciary as part of a complex unity within the state
The judiciary continues to "play a part, ideologically and through
repression, in the social struggles over and within the South African
state."' 43 Conflicts within the judiciary and particularly between the ju-
diciary and other branches of the state surfaced again with the declara-
tion of states of emergency in the mid-1980s, and with the imposition of
security legislation limiting the jurisdiction of the courts."4
However, after a series of "enlightened" rulings rejecting various
emergency provisions introduced by the government - including
favorable rulings for detainees and the issuing of injunctions to prevent
police brutality against some detainees - Tsenoli v. The State,4 5 signaled
a general retreat on the part of the judiciary. Possibly the judges were
concerned that they "had overstepped the bounds of reasonable judicial
intervention."' 46
Although the courts are at one moment sites of struggle against the
apartheid system 147 and at other times mediate conflicts between con-
138. Act 53 of 1955.
139. Davidson, supra note 122, at 718-19 and J. DUGARD, supra note 120, at 31.
140. J. DUGARD, supra note 120, at 31.
141. S. Afr. Const. Act 32 of 1961.
142. J. DUGARD, supra note 120, at 35.
143. Suttner, supra note 9, at 48.
144. Declaration of a State of Emergency, No. R. 108, 1986, Government Gazette No.
3963. See generally J. DUGARD, supra note 120.
145. See infra note 218.
146. Haysom & Kahanovitz, Courts and the State of Emergency, in SOUTH AFRICAN RE-
VIEW 4, 187, 197 (Moss & Obery eds. 1987).
147. Apart from the role of political trials in the struggle for self-determination in South
Africa, the courts continue to serve as the focus of struggles to alleviate conditions of detention
and imprisonment as well as the various community struggles against the imposition of high
rents, forced removal etc. In addition the special labour courts serve to direct the legal strug-
gles between workers and management to issues of wages, safety, and union recognition.
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tending views of how to maintain white rule, judicial interventions are
complex and contradictory. The courts change over time or as a result of
variations in the judicial relationship to other state structures, changes in
the strategies of domination employed by other state structures or
changes in the personnel of the judiciary itself. 4
By remaining within the "bounds of reasonable judicial interven-
tion," the judiciary is able to secure its existence in a contradictory unity
with other state structures which function to maintain the cohesion of
the existing social system as a whole.149 Thus, when considered as a par-
ticular state structure, the judicial system has both internal contradic-
tions of its own and a relative autonomy 50 from other state structures. 151
2. The Courts v. The People
Although the Supreme Court in its various forms plays an impor-
tant role in maintaining legitimacy and resolving disputes among mem-
bers of the upper classes, it is recognized, even by some judges, that the
law is inaccessable "to the vast majority of those people who need its
assistance." 1 52 Raymond Suttner notes that the general political and aca-
demic focus on the functioning of the Supreme Court excludes the peo-
ple's experience of the law, which is primarily in the lower courts.1 53 It is
these courts which apply apartheid legislation.
148. Suttner, supra note 9, at 49.
149. Id. at 49.
150. Wolpe argues that although
state apparatuses are... the means by which certain class powers are organised and
that, by this token these apparatuses become the sites of determinate contradictions,
conflicts and struggles. Contradiction and conflict is not however merely encapsu-
lated within particular apparatuses but occurs equally between apparatuses ... [t]his
may be due in part, to the pattern of access/exclusion which... operate unequally in
relation to different apparatuses, but it may also be attributable to other conditions
including the way in which the functional activities of different state branches come
to be defined.
Wolpe, supra note 21, at 418-19.
151. The state as a whole on the other hand must be conceived of not as an instrument but
as a complex structure of contradiction and conflict. What becomes significant is precisely the
noncomplementary and, indeed, competing policies which may be pursued by specific state
apparatuses. Id. at 419.
152. This view was expressed publicly by Justice J.C. Kriegler, speaking at the annual
meeting of the Pretoria branch of Lawyers for Human Rights on 16 December 1985.
FACULTY OF LAW, UNIvERsrrY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW 1985 [hereinafter ANNUAL SURVEY 1985].
153. Suttner, Book Review, 1 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. Rfs. 279, 283 (1985).
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a. The lower courts
There were 306 districts in 1981, with a magistrate's office in each
district.154 Magistrates are members of the public service (civil service)
and in addition to judicial functions, perform the administrative func-
tions of other state departments. 155
The jurisdiction of the magistrate's court is limited to a district or
subdistrict defined geographically. 156 Magistrates have criminal jurisdic-
tion over all offenses except treason, murder, and rape, 157 but are only
permitted to inflict limited penalties. 158 Additionally, they have only
limited civil jurisdiction. 159
b. Special law and courts for "'Blacks"
For the majority of South Africans, the judicial system does not
function. Black South Africans are faced not only with racially discrimi-
natory laws enacted by a legislature in which they are not represented,
but also with a judicial system that functions according to a host of ra-
cially determined conditions. 6 ' Until 1984 the majority of black people
experienced the formalized application of the law in a special legal and
court system. 16  This system of "special" courts having jurisdiction over
cases between Africans was established under the 1927 Black Adminis-
tration Act 162 and was "intended to bring into being forums designed to
suit the 'psychology' of the African, recreating as nearly as possible the
atmosphere of the tribal court to which Africans were accustomed to
submit their disputes."1 63
154. J. CLOETE, supra note 13, at 203.
155. Id. These functions include immigration and passports and health and welfare, in
areas where such departments do not have local offices.
156. Id. at 204.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 204-05.
160. See generally A. SACHS, supra note 38.
161. Until 1984, blacks generally entered the judicial system through a series of special
courts. At the lowest level of this structure are the chiefs' courts. These are established by the
appointment of an African chief or headman by the Minister of Co-operation and Develop-
ment to hear civil claims between 'black persons' [Africans] in his area of jurisdiction. Pro-
ceedings in these courts, which have a limited jurisdiction (fine of R40) and a limited right of
appeal to the Commissioners' courts, are informal and unrecorded. With the scrapping of the
Commissioners' courts the right of appeal is to the magistrates' courts, J. CLOETE, supra note
13, at 206-07.
162. Black Administration Act No.38 of 1927, § 11(1).
163. See Suttner, supra note 40, at 51 citing Motaung v. Dube 1930 NAC Part 1 (N&T)
143. The maintenance and encouragement by the state of "traditional" customary law has,
among other effects, had direct economic implications. By buttressing the patriarchal joint
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These Commissioners' courts"' dealt mainly with criminal offenses
and the pass laws,165 sending "hundreds of thousands of 'illegal' African
workers [to face] jail sentences each year." '66 Even when deciding civil
cases between Africans, these courts never performed in a manner re-
motely comparable to precolonial chiefs' courts, which generally re-
flected the interdependence of the courts' officers (chiefs and elders) and
family system of 'tribal' society (to the extent that 'Black law' prevents the emergence of wo-
men as 'free legal subjects') it consolidates the family-centred, male-dominated 'tribal' redis-
tributive system. The survival of this system helps to subsidize the wage level of migrant
workers, thus subsidizing capitalist production by subsistence agriculture in the bantustans.
See id. at 53.
164. One form of "special" courts was the Commissioners' Courts. Commissioners' Courts
were established on a district basis, and also served as the local offices of the Department of
Co-operation and Development, the government department which controlled the daily lives
of Africans. The Commissioners' courts had the same jurisdiction as magistrates' courts in
criminal offences committed by "blacks" [Africans] with the right of appeal to the relevant
division of the Supreme Court. In addition the Commissioners' courts had jurisdiction in civil
actions between "black persons" [Africans]. Three appeal courts for Commissioners' courts
were established to hear appeals against judgements in civil cases. But an appeal against its
decision could only be lodged with the appellate division of the Supreme Court if the consent of
the appeals court was obtained on points reserved by that court. In each area where the courts
of appeal for commissioners' courts were established, a further court to hear suits concerning
marriage dissolutions between "blacks" [Africans] was also created. 3. CLOETE, supra note 13,
at 206-08.
165. The pass law system is one of the key instruments of apartheid and of the economic
exploitation of African workers.
Every African outside the bantustan areas who is over the age of 16 must carry a pass
book, a booklet containing a set of documents (it may be what the government calls a
'Reference Book', or a bantustan 'Passport'). Pass books immediately identify their
holders to any official; they show at a glance whether they have any right to be in a
particular area; whether or where they are employed- whether they have paid their
taxes....
People must produce their pass books on demand. Police raids resembling military
operations are carried out in the form of sweeps of areas. Since 1978 they have in-
creasingly involved military personnel.
If there is a charge and a trial, it takes place in the Commissioner's Court .... In
only a few cases is there any legal representation, and cases are dealt with in minutes.
A prosecutor who resigned in 1980 in protest at the way the courts were used to
implement apartheid described how the Pretoria Commissioner's Court regularly
dealt with 120 cases a day, and that none of those tried in 1980 were legally
represented....
Between 1948 and 1981 at least 12.5 million people were arrested or prosecuted
under the pass laws. People convicted under the pass laws constituted one third of all
sentenced prisoners in 1979.
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE AND AID FUND FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA in co-operation with the
UNITED NATIONS CENTRE AGAINST APARTHEID, APARTHEID: THE FACTS 43-45 (1983).
166. S. GREENBERG, LEGITIMATING THE ILLEGITIMATE: STATE, MARKETS, AND RE-
SISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 89 (1987).
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the community, including the opposing parties in a dispute. 167 Segre-
gated from the community, presiding officers 68 conduct formalistic pro-
ceedings in which the party who is represented almost invariably prevails
over an unrepresented party,169 despite the claim that litigants do not
need lawyers.
Although the courts have discretion as to the law to be applied in a
civil case between two African parties, they favor the "customary law" of
particular "tribes," applying special rules for resolving disputes when
parties are members of different "tribes."1 0 Preference for applying
"customary law" stems from a racist assumption which depicts Africans
as an undifferentiated mass, all of whom act, contract, and "lead their
lives generally according to 'tribal' patterns."'I The application of "cus-
tomary law" by the courts serves to further the policy of retribalization.
This reinforces the constitution of Africans as tribal subjects, and en-
courages identification with and allegiance to "tribal values" and "au-
thorities" - bantustan elites installed by the apartheid system, but who
rarely have legitimate geneological claims to the traditional
chieftaincy.
172
Significantly, the form of "tribal law" applied tends to be a "rigid
frozen form of original customary law."' 173 Courts refuse to recognize
the dynamic qualities of modem local custom which reflect the rapid
social change experienced by African societies. Instead, they portray
''customary law" as a "law which had its genesis in the ancient policy of
the founders of the race.... applied down through the ages to the pres-
ent time."'
174
Although the courts depict "customary law" as the authentic, un-
changing law of tribal Africa, they have occasionally altered customary
concepts and imposed certain common law categories and notions of in-
dividual property rights. Explaining the introduction of the concept of
167. See generally I. SCHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW AND CUSTOM (2d ed,
3d. reprint 1984).
168. Originally white commissioners, now magistrates, holding very low qualifications and
displaying the racist attitudes characteristic of the Department of Co-operation and Develop-
ment (black administration) or alternatively black Magistrates and chiefs appointed by the
regime and shunned by the community in retaliation for their participation in the Bantustan
system.
169. Suttner, supra note 40, at 53-54.
170. Id. at 51, 56.
171. Id. at 56.
172. Id. at 51.
173. Id.
174. Mazibuko v. Mazibuko 1930 NAC (N & T) 143, at 145-46, cited in Suttner, supra
note 40, at 57.
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"majority status" and the consequent holding that women were incapa-
ble of owning any category of property under "customary law," the court
revealed that
[i]t is when recourse is had to European courts with a procedure for-
eign to the Native system that complications and confusion results.
The European individualistic system regards one man as outright
owner, and it is in deference to the principles of that system that the
present-day idea of personal ownership in a kraalhead [family head]
has taken root. 175
This process of reformulating "customary law" was consolidated
when the Department of Plural Relations 76 established a committee (die
Komitee vir Inheemse Reg) to undertake the task of restating the system
of "customary law" in the bantustans. 177 This process of codification, by
a committee established by the government department charged with im-
plementing apartheid policy, will most likely result in an even more rigid
and stultifying interpretation of "customary law."
Regardless of the content of customary law, however, the attempt to
impose a tribal identity through the functioning of the legal system en-
deavors to undermine and reverse the development of a national con-
sciousness 178 and the historical development of a national movement -
processes through which Africans have reduced intertribal tensions. To-
day the government's vision of retribalization 179 is challenged by reality,
in which few black South Africans live as members of tribes, and by the
growth of the political struggle for democracy, which "interpellate[s]
Africans as Africans and as South Africans" rather than as members of
tribes.180
i) Restructuring the special courts
In 1984 the special courts were incorporated into the Department of
Justice and thus "no longer exist." 81 But in reality these courts "remain
175. Sijila v. Masumba 1940 NAC (C & 0) 42, at 47, cited in Suttner, supra note 40, at 57.
176. Originally the Department of Bantu Administration, it has since been named the De-
partment of Co-operation and Development, and is now incorporated into the Department of
Constitutional Development.
177. Bennett & Vermeulen, Codification of Customary Law, 24 . AIR. L 206, 207 n.8.
(1980).
178. Suttner, supra note 40, at 60.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 51; See also Suttner's references to the Freedom Charter and the Declaration of
the United Democratic Front in this regard, id. at 51 n.3.
181. See Cameron & van Zyl Smit, The Administration of Justice, Law Reform and Juris-
prudence, in ANNUAL SURVEY 1984, supra note 107, at 585.
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in existence, within a segregated system of appeals ... [although] [ilt is
not impossible that the government will ultimately agree to the integra-
tion of the special courts as a 'division' of the Magistrates' Courts. 1 82
Prosecution of pass law and influx control offenses, traditionally the
main function of the special courts, has been transferred to the magis-
trates' courts. 183 At the same time, control over both the movement of
labor and the population migration from rural to urban areas, the essence
of the pass law system,
has miraculously been reconstructed as 'interstate' relations. Imagi-
nary boundaries between African and white areas have become 'bor-
ders,' and their policing has increasingly fallen within the functional
jurisdiction of the Department of Foreign Affairs.... Labor bureaus,
one official imagines, will become 'passport and border points' and ille-
gal urban migration and employment will be circumscribed by legisla-
tion restricting 'illegal aliens.' 184
Thus, pass law prosecutions are replaced by deportation cases removing
"illegal aliens" to the "independent" bantustans, and the special courts
continue as "magistrates' courts" for the most part, as before. The only
significance of the reform is in their transfer from the Department of Co-
operation and Development to the Department of Justice.
E. Pressures for Change and the State's Response
After five years of intense resistance to the new tricameral constitu-
tion, even the government recognizes the need for social change in South
Africa. The questions remaining are how much and how soon? During
1988, the dominant view within the government seemed to favor a pro-
cess of controlled integration, along with the removal of local institutions
from political control, and the continued division of the African popula-
tion into those who will eventually be considered permanent "urban
dwellers" and those who will be denationalized through the creation of
"independent" bantustans.'85
1. Reform and Repression
Prominant legal academics in South Africa have increasingly ac-
182. Suttner, supra note 40, at 55.
183. RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1985, supra note 77, at 206.
184. S. GREENBERG, supra note 166, at 89.
185. See Davis, Repression and Integration: Two Sides of the Same Apparatus, 15 INT'L I,
OF THE SOC. OF L. 61 (1987). See also Cobbett, Glaser, Hindson & Swilling, Regionalism,
Federalism and the Reconstruction of the South African State, 10 S. AFR. LAD. BULL. 87
(1985).
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cused the judiciary of both showing a preference for the executive inter-
est over the individual in matters of security legislation and of being no
more than an "elegant frill on the sleeve of state power."' 6 In the early
1980s these allegations led to the appointment of a government commis-
sion to "examine the necessity, adequacy, fairness and efficacy of legisla-
tion relating to the protection of internal security."'18 7
a. The Rabie Commission and HSRC report
Under the chairmanship of Appeals Court Judge P.J. Rabie (later
Chief Justice), the Commission made minor changes in the laws regard-
ing detention without trial, and suggested the creation of two new statu-
tory crimes: subversion and sabotage.' 88 By attaching an extremely
broad definition to these new crimes, the Commission gave the state
greater flexibility in its attempts to manage the process of reform and
repression.18 9 At a time of increasing internal opposition and external
criticism, this judicial approval of security legislation and police practices
was important to the state's internal cohesion.'
In the same period, however, the Human Sciences Research Council
(HSRC), a government think tank, issued a critique of the courts in the
final report of its Investigation into Intergroup Relations.' 9 The report
acknowledged that the
legal system is suspect among large parts of the population, because on
the one hand, the administration of justice is controlled by whites and,
186. A. MATHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 302 (1986).
187. Davis, Political Trials in South Africa, in CRIME AND POWER IN SOuTH AFRICA 34,
39 (Davis & Slabbert ed. 1985).
188. For example the crime of subversion can be committed by any person who,
with intent to (a) overthrow or endanger the State authority in the Republic; (b)
achieve, bring about or promote any constitutional, political, industrial, social or eco-
nomic aim or change in the Republic; (c) induce the government of the Republic to
do or to abstain from doing any act or to adopt or to abandon a particular stand-
point; or (d) put in fear or demoralise the general public, a particular population
group or the inhabitants of a particular area in the Republic, or induce the said
public or such population group or inhabitants to do or to abstain from doing any act
- causes or promotes general dislocation or disorder of any place in the Republic or
attempts to do so, cripples, prejudices or interrupts at any place in the Republic, any
industry or undertaking or industries or undertakings generally, causes or encourages
or foments feelings of hostility between different 'population groups' or parts of 'pop-
ulation groups' of the Republic or attempts to do so.
Id. at 41. This allows the security apparatus complete flexibility in its attempts to restrict the
activities of opponents of the regime, regardless of the form or extent of the activity.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 43.
191. HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SouTH AFRICAN SoCIETY: REALITIES
AND PROSPECTS 129-36 (1987).
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on the other, because, as a result of various economic, language and
other factors, legal processes and administration as well as penal and
litigation procedures have become inaccessible and incomprehensible
to many. 19
2
Although the committee recognizes that "national interest" requires the
state to be protected, the report criticizes the application of security laws
and warns that the "legitimacy crisis in the legal system will have to be
resolved systematically through training, legal aid, guidance and reform,
since mistrust of a legal system is one of the strongest incentives for
revolution." 193 The government accepted the report's general call for re-
form, but President P.W. Botha rejected criticism of the judicial system
and law enforcement agencies as invalid. 194
b. The Hoexter Commission
The Final Report of the Hoexter Commission of inquiry into the
structure and functioning of the courts represents the government's most
detailed investigation into the problem of reforming the judicial system.
The Commission, which was established by the government in 1979
under the chairmanship of Justice G.G. Hoexter of the Natal Provincial
Division of the Supreme Court, was asked to explore:
a. Establishment of an intermediate court between the lower
courts and the Supreme Court;
b. Establishment of a family court;
c. Restricting appeals on fact to one appeal to one superior
court;
d. Restricting appeals to the Appellate Division to appeals on
questions of law and appeals also on fact where the death sen-
tence has been imposed;
e. Providing special machinery for the settlement of minor civil
disputes in an informal manner;
f. Bringing the "Special courts for 'Blacks'" and other courts
attached to different government departments under the ad-
ministrative responsibility of the Minister of Justice.195
Evidence heard by the Commission criticized the standards of the magis-
trates' courts as second rate, because they lack the funds for first rate
192. Id. at 166.
193. Id. at 166-67.
194. Id. at 198.
195. Kahn, The Didcott Memorandum and Other Submissions to the Hoexter Commission,
97 S. AFR. L.J. 651 (1981).
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personnel or facilities.196 Criticizing the relationship between the
Supreme Court and the Department of Justice, it was argued that "the
servant of the Supreme Court seems in many ways to have become its
master."19 7 Concern was focused on the Department of Justice's influ-
ence over appointments to the bench. 198 Justice Dideott told the Com-
mission he questioned the ability of the magistrates, who are all civil
servants and handle the bulk of the country's court work, to be independ-
ent of executive and legislative policy. 19 9
The Commission rejected the establishment of an intermediate
court.2"° However, it advocated the separation of the administrative
work from the judicial functions of the magistrates' courts and suggested
they be given increased jurisdiction."1 It also suggested that all judicial
officers in the lower courts become independent of the civil service.2"a
Most significant for the African majority, the Commission argued that
there was no moral justification for separate court structures and con-
demned them as "a negation of the principle that all are equal before the
law," heralding the abolition of the commissioners' courts on September
1, 1984.203
Finally, the Commission voiced its concern over the declining legiti-
macy of the judiciary and recommended the establishment of a Council
of Justice, with representatives from the judiciary, the magistracy, both
branches of the legal profession, various officials, and even the lay pub-
lic.2 4 Although the Minister of Justice remarked in Parliament that the
idea had merit,2"5 the government had not considered or implemented
the Commission's recommendation by early 1989.
The overall effect of these three different initiatives to rebuild the
credibility of the judiciary has been continuously undermined by the
196. Id. at 653.
197. Id. at 659.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 656-60. Judge Didcott refers in his criticism of the relationship between the
magistrates, as civil servants, and other state agencies, to a page from a code of instructions
issued to magistrates by the Department of Justice. The instruction deals with the attitude
required of magistrates towards the police and warns the magistrates that public confidence in
the police force may be damaged by general criticisms of it expressed from the Bench; and it
enjoins them, "whenever they have adverse comments to make on the conduct of particular
policemen, to convey these rather to the responsible officers in official but private communica-
tions." Id.
200. ANNUAL SURVEY 1984, supra note 107, at 583.
201. Id. 583-84.
202. Id. at 583.
203. Id. at 585.
204. Id. at 582.
205. Id.
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state of emergency which includes the detention of thousands of children
and the charging of hundreds of antiapartheid activists with public vio-
lence, treason, and subversion.
2. A Permanent State of Emergency
South Africa's second State of Emergency 20 6 -was declared on July
21, 1985, six months into an uprising launched by African township resi-
dents in the Vaal Triangle.20 7 As black resistance escalated into a na-
tional revolt against the new tricameral constitution, officials
acknowledged that in addition to at least 2,387 deaths by February1987, 2°
[t]here were 350,000 African township residents in the Vaal Triangle
who had not paid rent since the September unrest; 155 townships had
ultimately been caught up in the spreading unrest; the homes of at least
300 town councillors and African policemen had been damaged by
protest actions; 12 town councillors had been killed, 240 town council-
lors had resigned their positions, and an unknown number of black
police had had to be housed in white areas; somewhere between
250,000 and 650,000 students had boycotted classes at any given time
over the previous year; 3,000 Africans were arrested before this first
'State of Emergency' and at least 8,000 during it, while the principal
leaders of the umbrella-type protest organizations were put on trial for
treason.
20 9
Declared in terms of Section 2(1) of the Public Safety Act,210 the Emer-
gency gives the state president the power under Section 3(1)(a) to make
"such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for pro-
viding for the safety of the public, or the maintenance of public order and
for making adequate provision for terminating such emergency or for
dealing with any circumstances which in his opinion have arisen or are
likely to arise as a result of such emergency. '211
Pursuant to Section 2(1) of the Public Safety Act the state president
proclaimed new regulations:212 1) granting the secudty forces nearly un-
206. Proclamation R120 of 1985. This was the first of a number of states of emergency
declared following the September 1984 uprising. South Africa's first State of Emergency was
declared in 1960 following the banning of the African National Congress and Pan African
Congress.
207. RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1985, supra note 77, at 455.
208. Apartheid Barometer, 3 Weekly Mail No.27, July 10-16, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
209. S. GREENBERG, supra note 166, at 179.
210. Act 3 of 1953.
211. Section 3(l)(a) of the Public Safety Act; See also RAcE RELATIONS SURVEY 1985,
supra note 77, at 456.
212. Proclamation R121 of 1985.
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limited powers with civil and criminal indemnity; 2) imposing restric-
tions on funerals and on the media; 3) prohibiting 102 organizations from
organizing or holding gatherings; and 4) allowing the extension of deten-
tion beyond 14 days, at the discretion of the relevant government minis-
ter, "without notice to any person and without [a] hearing [by] any
person.
213
Only three months lapsed between the lifting of the Emergency on
March 7, 1986, and the imposition of even more severe emergency condi-
tions throughout the country on June 12, 1986. The provisions of the
third Emergency,214 repeatedly extended by regulations issued in terms
of Section 3(1)(a) of the Public Safety Act, were renewed in 1987 and
again in June 1988. There are no signs that the government plans to lift it
in the near future.
a. Conflict in the courts
The effect of the State of Emergency on the judicial order is revealed
in setbacks suffered by political organizations, trade unions, and human
rights lawyers. In the early 1980s, such groups acknowledged the con-
tradictory nature of the judicial order and began to adopt a more tactical
approach to the use of legal institutions.215 Trade unions in particular
managed to "secure significant rights to job security, and freedom from
victimization and a variety of unfair labour practices" in the Industrial
Court, allowing "disenfranchised employees to call a white employer to
account., 216 These victories encouraged a host of legal challenges
against some aspects of apartheid policy including security legislation.
21 7
The imposition of the 1985 State of Emergency was met in the
courts by a "rush of cases challenging emergency regulations and the
detention of individuals. [these cases] came to an abrupt halt after the
Tsenoli2t8 appeal judgment ' 219 restored the authority of the security
forces to detain individuals under Emergency regulations. By the end of
213. RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1985, supra note 77, at 456-62.
214. Proclamation R108 of 1986.
215. Haysom & Kahanovitz, supra note 146, at 189.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 189, 191, & 197.
218. 1986 (4) SA 1150(A). In Tsenoli v. The State President, a full bench of the Natal
Supreme Court decided the government's regulations permitting arrest and detention were
unlawful and ordered Lechesa Tsenoli released. 2 Weekly Mail No.32, Aug. 21, 1986, at 1, col.
1; The Appellate Division in reviewing Tsenoli held that the State President did not go beyond
the powers conferred upon him by § 3(1)(a) of the enabling Act and thus a person may be
arrested and detained under regulation 3 (of the emergency regulations) if the arresting officer
thinks it is necessary for the safety of the public, the maintenance of public order or the termi-
nation of the state of emergency. Basson, Judicial Activism in a State of Emergency: An Exami-
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1987, the possibility of using the courts to limit the Emergency powers of
the state or to create limited space for opposition to apartheid seemed all
but dead.220
Initially, the courts rejected a few of the worst restrictions imposed
by Emergency regulations. These early court victories gave way to suc-
cessive judgments by the Appellate Division which held that the state has
virtually unlimited power under Emergency provisions.221 In a joint rul-
ing on three applications the Court's judgment dealt with two major is-
sues: (1) the right of Emergency detainees to be heard (the audi alteram
partem rule) and (2) their right to receive lawyers' visits. 222 The majority
accepted the executive's right to remove these rights. They reasoned
"that there is a State of Emergency which demands extraordinary pow-
ers, and the state president has a virtually unchecked discretion to issue
any orders, even orders which might normally be declared void on the
grounds of unreasonableness. 223
Along with this general "retreat on the part of the judiciary which
may have become concerned that it had overstepped the bounds of rea-
sonable judicial intervention, '  came state action designed to overturn
many earlier judicial decisions. 225 The government's legal draftsmen
produced new regulations to meet the courts' criticisms. 226 Further-
more, the security forces began to follow technical procedures, in an ef-
fort to avoid court challenges.227 The courts required only the
appearance of fairness in procedure and accepted that Emergency regula-
tions gave the security forces wide discretionary powers.228 For example,
"once the police had learnt the required formula for justifying a deten-
tion, they could and did advance.., such reasons. '2 : 9 Finally, the exec-
utive sought to use "ouster provisions" in the regulations to exclude
judicial intervention. So far the courts have ignored this attempt to re-
nation of Recent Decisions of the South Afican Courts, 3 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 28, 40-41
(1987).
219. Human Rights Index, 3 S. AFR. 3. ON HUM. RTS. 125, 129 (1987).
220. Rickard, This Year's Message to Despondent Civil Rights Lawyers: Pack Your Bags, 3
Weekly Mail No.51, Dec. 24, 1987 - Jan. 14, 1988, at 8, col. 3.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 8, col. 4, 5.
223. Id. at 8, col. 5, 9, col. 1.
224. Haysom & Kahanovitz, supra note 146, at 197.
225. Id.
226. Id
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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move their jurisdiction to examine the validity of executive action. 230
b. Lower courts: punishment by process
Although early victories in the Supreme Court, such as requiring
the police to account for their actions,231 are significant, it is quite clear
that the "lower courts were acting as part of the state's disciplinary ma-
chinery.... "232 The stream of "public violence" cases that have filled
the magistrates' courts since 1985 amount to "punishment by
process.'- 33
Mass arrests, including "substitute arrests - brother for brother,
father for son, neighbour for neighbour;" assaults and torture, followed
by detention while awaiting trial; and protracted court proceedings often
end in dismissals for lack of evidence. 4 Nine months of monitoring by
the Black Sash (a human rights organization made up predominantly of
white women) revealed "that 42% of those accused were juveniles, and
that only 13% of adults and 17% ofjuveniles were found guilty."'"2 5 It is
clear from these figures that:
very large numbers of innocent people are arrested in random fashion
and charged on flimsy evidence that cannot stand up to examination in
court. They are thus made to endure a protracted period of punish-
ment by process with little hope of redress... When the accused are
acquitted or discharged, the family is too weary and disturbed to want
to face any suit for wrongful arrest or further court proceedings: it is
sufficient to be free.23
6
The Emergency regulations specifically grant indemnity to members
of the security forces. This prevents any civil or criminal proceeding
against them "as a result of [their] reckless, negligent, or unlawful acts
committed 'in good faith,"' and requires a plaintiff to prove "malice or
bad faith on the part of the police."'-2 7
c. Effects on the judicial order
The executive has in effect granted the security forces "a licence for
official lawlessness."'-38 This prevents township residents from taking
230. Basson, supra note 218, at 42-43.
231. Haysom & Kahanovitz, supra note 146, at 192.
232. Id. at 191.
233. Crewe, Punishment by Process, SASH, May 1987, at 19-20.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 20.
236. Id.
237. Haysom & Kahanovitz, supra note 146, at 195.
238. Id.
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their grievances against the authorities before a judicial forum. Victims
either fear to take complaints of brutality or even killings to the police -
the very people who have acted against them - or they see their com-
plaints rejected by the courts because of the indemnity granted to the
security forces. This denial of access is different from the "punishment by
process," meted out daily by the criminal justice system. A University of
Natal law professor ascribed the attitude of the Supreme Court to the
"[e]mergency climate, which seems to have affected all institutions in
South Africa, including the courts.
239
An observer for the International Commission of Jurists at the trea-
son trial of Helene Passtoors concluded that there is "justification to the
viewpoint of black people and concerned whites that most South African
courts in their uncritical and 'positivist' approach to apartheid legislation
merely serve as instruments of repression. '
This crisis of legitimacy, in which "the law has lost its protective
capacity and has mainly oppressive connotations," explains why some
lawyers and even "judges are increasingly concerned to distance legal
institutions from apartheid's laws. In this way they hope to recapture
some of the ground that has been lost.., to the risky but expeditious and
inexpensive forum of the people's courts."" 1
I. THE JUDICIAL ORDER AND TRANSITION TO A
NEW SOCIETY
Although an analysis of the existing judicial system is a precondition
to a consideration of how it may be transformed, alternative scenarios
need to be considered. Clearly, choices made in the struggle to defeat the
apartheid regime will have consequences in the process of reconstruction.
An exploration of alternative scenarios, however, is useful only if
grounded in real experience.
In order to develop a realistic assessment of the opportunities and
difficulties facing judicial transformation in a future democratic nonracial
South Africa, this Note uses the experiences of other societies that have
recently undergone or are now going through rapid social change to
identify issues and difficulties that may arise in South Africa. This is not
to say that the situations will be identical, as both the problems and solu-
tions will differ in their specifics. It is certainly relevant, however, to
239. Rickard, supra note 220, at 9, col. 5.
240. Sidley, World Jurists Slam S.A. Courts, 2 Weekly Mail No.45, Nov. 14-20, 1986, at 2,
col. 1.
241. Haysom & Kahanovitz, supra note 146, at 198.
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identify the general issues that have arisen as a result of particular orga-
nizational forms and experiments in these societies.
The premises of the following discussion are first, that majority rule
will come to South Africa, and second, that it is most likely to arise in
the context of three very general alternative scenarios. The first scenario
involves a negotiated settlement in the medium-term future, which would
result in a postapartheid constitution being drafted and accepted as part
of the decolonization process. In this scenario the judicial system may be
retained with minor modifications for a specified period of time after the
transition of political power. This scenario will be explored by consider-
ing the experience of Zimbabwe.
The second scenario involves a protracted civil war coupled with a
near total destruction of the productive system and total disruption of
the state administrative apparatus - which could be characterized as an
institutional void. This scenario, although unlikely in the case of South
Africa, will be explored by considering the experience of Mozambique.
The final scenario involves a negotiated transfer of power, in which
as a result of the mobilization of the population and expansion of armed
struggle, the balance of power shifts dramatically to the popular forces.
That shift would enable the incoming government to conduct an exten-
sive institutional restructuring of state structures, including the judicial
system. Although there were no final negotiations before the transfer of
power in Nicaragua, the old institutions were not completely disrupted
and the new government has attempted to undertake a process of institu-
tional restructuring that is instructive as a example of this scenario.
A. A Negotiated Constitution: Zimbabwe
The experience of Zimbabwe demonstrates the constraints that may
be placed upon a newly independent state by the process of decoloniza-
tion. As a result institutional change has been gradual, often restrained
by the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement. Yet despite these re-
strictions, the Zimbabwean government has been able to restructure the
judicial order, particularly at the local level.
1. Constitutional Formation in the Process of Decolonization:
Placing Constraints on Judicial Transformation
The history of Africa's post-colonial constitutions demonstrates that
"too often constitution-makers representing populist or radical indepen-
dence movements have written [or been forced in negotiations to accept]
constitutions that after independence made it difficult to use state power
1988]
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to achieve the movement's political objectives. 24 2
The Lancaster House Agreement,243 the negotiated political settle-
ment which preceded the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, was ac-
cepted by Zimbabwe's liberation movement, despite their "many
objections to the Summary of the Independence Constitution.'"24 The
Patriotic Front delegates objected to a number of provisions, including
the entrenchment of racial representation for seven years through the
guarantee of twenty white seats in the hundred-seat House of Assem-
bly." 5 They also objected to the "British proposals on property rights
[which] converted 'the freedom from deprivation of property into a right
to retain privilege and perpetuate injustice.' ",246
The need to compromise in order to achieve independence and
peace meant that on April 18, 1980, "Prime Minister Mugabe's Govern-
ment set about governing on the basis of a Constitution247 drafted and
given by the British, which the Prime Minister had scarcely had a chance
to glance at between its being laid before the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment on December 7, 1979, and the signing of the Lancaster House
Agreement on December 21, 1979. "248 The Independence Constitution
included provisions leaving the prerevolutionary state structure en-
shrined in the new state's Constitution. Furthermore, although British
senior civil servants could be dismissed by the relevant government min-
ister, the new government did not have a similar power. When the un-
written British constitution was codified for export to its former colonies,
it included independent Civil Service Commissions as a device for plac-
ing "the Civil Service beyond the discipline of elected officials. ' '249
Specific constitutional provisions left the general organization of the
civil service to the Public Service Commission, thus circumscribing the
242. Seidman, Perspectives on Constitution-making: Independence Constitutlon for Namibla
and South Africa, 3 Lesotho L.J. 45 (1988).
243. See generally Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster
House, London, September - December 1979, Cmnd. No.7802.
244. Zvobgo, The Zimbabwe Constitution After Four Years of Independence, Pun. L.,J
447 (1984). See also Documents on the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference, Annex C
Patriotic Front Response to British Constitutional Proposals for Zimbabwe, 4 J. oF S. APR. A V.
490 (1979).
245. Zvobgo, supra note 244, at 447.
246. Id.
247. Zimbabwe's independence was enacted by the British Parliament through the passing
of the Zimbabwe Constitution Order in Council 1979 (Statutory Instrument 1600) passed
under the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1979, S.1. No. 1600 (UK) and by the Zimbabwe Act, 1979
which conferred independence.
248. Zvobgo, supra note 244, at 448.
249. Seidman, supra note 242, at 60.
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new government's ability to restructure the state sector.2"0 Formal quali-
fications, which no black Zimbabwean officially possessed at the time of
independence, were stipulated for particular posts.-51 These provisions
- including the provision in the Lancaster House Agreement that guar-
anteed the jobs of existing civil servants - left the daily operation of
state structures, which the new government would call upon to imple-
ment policies of social change, in the hands of officials who were often
fundamentally opposed to such policies. 5'
2. Constitutional Reform as a Means to Facilitate Judicial
Transformation
In order to overcome these constitutional restrictions, the
Zimbabwe government began to introduce a series of constitutional
amendments in 1981. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act
No. 27 of 1981,111 changed sections 36, 74, and 90 of the Constitution."'
These changes allowed Zimbabweans who were formerly excluded by the
requirement of lengthy previous service as lawyers or senior civil servants
to "sit on the Senate Legal Committee, the Public Service Commission
and, with the Chief Justice and the Chairman of the Public Service Com-
mission, . . . [on the] Judicial Service Commission."" 55 Subsequent
amendments 1) changed the structure of the legal profession and created
a new judicial hierarchy;256 2) removed restrictions blocking former
members of Parliament from serving on the Electorial Supervisory Com-
mission and the Judicial Service Commission;" 7 3) allowed for the ap-
pointment of judges to the Supreme Court and High Court for fixed
periods; and 4) increased the size of the Judicial Service Commission by
adding the Attorney-General and increasing to three the number of pres-
250. ZnMB. CONST. § 75 (1)(a) provided in part that the functions of the Public Service
Commission include regulating and controlling "the general organization of the Public
Service."
251. Seidman, supra note 242, at 46.
252. Id. at 68-73 (No. 2).
253. ZIMB. CONST. Amend., Act No.27 (1981).
254. See ZIMm. CONST., in CONsTrrtrTiONS OF THE CoUNTrIS OF THE WORLD 19 (Oce-
ana Publications, Zimb. Supp. 1987).
255. Zvobgo, supra note 244, at 457; See ZIMB. CONSr. Amend. (No.2) Act, No.27 (1981).
256. ZIMB. CONST. Amend. (No.2) Act, No.25 of 1981, repealed sections 79, 80, and 81
and scrapped the old Appellate Division and General Division of the High Court and replaced
them with a new Supreme Court and High Court. The amendment also fused the professions
of advocate and attorney into the single profession of legal practitioner. See CoNsTrrItoNs
oF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Zimbabwe, supra note 254, at 19; Zvobgo, supra note
244, at 457.
257. ZimB. CONST. Amend. (No.3) Act, No.1 (1983).
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idential appointees to the committee.258
3. Restructuring the Inherited Judicial System: Systematizing
Lay Participation in the Judicial Process
Upon independence in April 1980, Zimbabwe's new government in-
herited the colonial legal system intact. This consisted of a triadic struc-
ture, representing the three forms in which law was applied in the
colonial period: first, the hierarchy of common law courts; second, the
courts of the colonial administrator for African civil disputes; and finally,
the tribal courts which were to apply customary law and were headed by
the chiefs or headmen appointed by the colonial administration. 25 9 As a
settler colony Rhodesia had a local judiciary which - unlike its counter-
part in Mozambique - did not depart en masse with the lowering of the
colonial flag. As a result, in the period immediately following indepen-
dence, the judicial structure consisted of predominantly the same func-
tionaries who had staffed it during the colonial period.
In addition to the 1981 constitutional amendments, which restruc-
tured the higher courts and legal profession, the Zimbabwe Parliament
passed the Customary Law and Primary Courts Actl2 in February 1981,
promising that the widely condemned customary court structures re-
maining from the colonial period would be swept away by "popular jus-
tice" and "people's courts. ' 261 The purpose of the Act was to eliminate
the racial basis of the court system, while at the same time providing
popular judicial forums and restoring customary law to the center of na-
tional life.262
Significantly, the Act was also intended to end the informal or party
political courts that emerged during the armed struggle. As the intensi-
fying war disrupted the colonial administration in the rural areas, the
liberation movement created rudimentary administration with Village
Committees, 263 made up of either guerrillas or the local political
branch.26 After the cease-fire on December 15, 1979, these courts began
to hear fewer "matters of war" and more private disputes.265 By late
258. ZIMB. CONT. Amend. (No.4) Act, No.4 (1984).
259. Ladley, Changing the Courts in Zimbabwe: The Customary Law and Primary Courts
Act, 26 J. OF APR. L. 95, 95-97 (1982).
260. Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, No.6 (1981).
261. Ladley, supra note 259, at 95.
262. Id. at 101.
263. Redgment, The Legal System of Zimbabwe, in 6 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDIA at § 1.2(c)(3) (K. Redden ed. 1985).
264. Ladley, supra note 259, at 101.
265. Id.
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1980 the government made a policy decision to end the activities of these
courts, which were increasingly referred to as "kangaroo courts," on the
grounds that they were "necessary in war, but not in peace." 66
The Customary Law and Primary Courts Act267 was part of a wider
legislative program aimed at transferring authority in land administra-
tion and judicial matters away from old colonial forms and traditional
authority to an elected leadership.2 68 Although the Act does not specifi-
cally embrace the "elective" principle (Community Court presiding of-
ficers are civil servants and Section 8(1)(a) of the 1981 Act allows the
Minister to appoint village court presiding officers269) in practice the
"presiding officer and his two assessors were elected by show of hands at
public meetings in local government wards throughout Zimbabwe.""27
In addition the Act requires judges to account for their choice of law
between customary and general Zimbabwe law. Thus, the Act creates a
possibility for litigants to participate in the choice of law. This policy
choice "embodies a change in perspective from one of control over the
courts by the governing elite to a sharing of power between the judiciary
and the litigants."2 7 In contrast to the colonial elite's manipulation of
the rules of recognition to ensure their control over the content of cus-
tomary law, the Act allows litigants to influence the choice of law and is
a "first [step] towards a filly democratic court system."'272
The proliferation of these new courts, particularly at the village
level, and the increased volume of litigation is ample testimony to their
availability and popularity.27 There are already three times as many vil-
lage courts as there were chiefs and headmen's courts. But their activi-
ties, backed by the state, have grown increasingly formal, and have lost
some of their character of informal reconciliation forums.2 "4 As a result
some commentators raise questions about the new courts' wider effect on
Zimbabwean society.2 75 This increase in litigation may, on the other
hand, only reflect changes already taking place in the society as a whole,
including the greater accessibility of these courts. But whatever the im-
266. Id. at 100-01.
267. Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, supra note 260 (as amended by Act 21 of
1982).
268. Ladley, supra note 259, at 101.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 109.
271. Seidman, Rules of Recognition in the Primary Courts of Zimbabwe: On Lawyets'Rea-
sonings and Customary Law, I & 2 ZIMB. L. REv. 41, 71 (1983-84).
272. Id.
273. Ladley, supra note 259, at 114.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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mediate reasons for their popularity and whatever problems there have
been in implementation, "the genius of the Customary Law and Primary
Courts Act is that it has provided a court structure consistent with the
pulse of social and legal change in Zimbabwe. '276
4. Social Change and the New Judicial Order
Although the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act introduced a
more legitimate forum at the local level, these courts have not provided
the basis for a more thorough transformation of the judicial order. These
courts are restricted primarily to the application of customary law in a
system in which legislative statutes and general Zimbabwe law have
greater status due to the continuing dominance of the formal courts and
legal profession within the judicial order. As a result, this new judicial
form serves only as a forum f6r the resolution of local disputes. Without
a redistribution of resources at the local level or local political mobiliza-
tion, the newly elected judicial officers may tend to represent traditional
local authority rather than popular participation within the judicial sys-
tem. Consequently, these new judicial forums may serve the opposite
function of reinforcing the customary order rather than becoming zones
of struggle between old and new ideas.
B. An Institutional Void: Mozambique
In the case of total colonial withdrawal or military victory, the new
government is faced with the immediate task of establishing some form
of structure through which to implement its policies. Independence
came to Mozambique in 1975 in the context of a double revolution in
both the colony and in Portugal. This resulted in the "massive departure
of European settlers, the near total destruction of the productive system,
[and] the stoppage and total disruption of the State administrative appa-
ratus, including the administration of justice. '277
Although the new Mozambique government tended to use existing
structures to implement its programs, the "hurried escape of senior and
middle-ranking administrators, and the inability to replace them at short
notice caused a very serious institutional void."'2 78 The shortage of legal
personnel in particular, which had become increasingly manifest as the
colonial system crumbled,279 was "exacerbated by the flight of judges,
276. Id.
277. de Sousa Santos, From Customary Law to Popular Justice, 28 J. AFR. L. 90, 91 (1984).
278. Id.
279. During the colonial period all the major decisions which guided the life of the courts
their creation, dissolution, the definition of their powers, the appointment, transfer or retire-
[Vol. 12
The South African Judicial Order
lawyers, and clerks after independence, [making] the revamping of the
court system and the drafting of a new legal code a difficult task."'2"
1. Creating a Constitutional Framework: The Basis of the New
Social and Judicial Order
On June 20, 1975, five days before independence, the Central Com-
mittee of FRELIMO28' approved the Constitution of the People's Re-
public of Mozambique. FRELIMO's purpose in adopting the
Constitution was to establish a framework through which it could extend
to the whole country the experience gained in ten years of armed struggle
and in the liberated zones.2" 2 The new Constitution was substantially
different from those of most new African states28 3 because it reflected the
new government's political objectives and left the new state unhindered
by restrictions such as those faced by the new Zimbabwean
government. 2
But despite this opportunity to start from a completely new slate,
Article 79 of the new Constitution provided that "[fjormer legislation
which is not contrary to the Constitution shall be maintained in force
until such time as it is altered or revoked. ' 285 Three years later the Peo-
ple's National Assembly approved various amendments to the Constitu-
tion, the most significant of which dealt with the functions of the
ment of judicial officers - were taken in Lisbon. With the advance of the national liberation
struggle the judicial structures began to reflect the general crisis of the colonial system.
Cases piled up and the judicial machine responded only with difficulty to what was
expected of it in the service of the dominant class interests ....
On the other hand, the foreign judicial officers - who had a monopoly of senior
positions on the bench, and who as foreigners, had all the senior office jobs as well -
nevertheless were not in great supply. It became increasingly difficult to recruit from
amongst the citizens of the colonising power the personnel necessary to ensure the
normal functioning of the judicial structures.
And so, in various provinces ... , there already did not exist many years before
[independence], judges or prosecutors.
Speech by R. Baltazar to the Faculty of Law, at Eduardo Mondlane University (April 1978),
REPRINTED IN STATE PAPERS AND PARTY PROCEEDINGS 9-10 Series 2, No.2, (A. Sachs ed.
1979).
280. Keehan, The Legal System of Mozambique, in MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDU, supra note 263, at § 1.4(B)(1).
281. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.
282. Speech by S. Vieira to a conference at the Faculty of Law, Eduardo Mondlane Univer-
sity (June-July 1977), reprinted in STATE PAP.RS AND PARTY PROCEEDINGS (Series 2, No.2,
A. Sachs ed. 1979).
283. Keehan, supra note 280, at § 1.3(A). The constitutions of most new African states
were written by and inherited from colonial governments.
284. See supra notes 242-246 and accompanying text.
285. MOZAMBIQUE CONST. art. 79.
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People's Assembly, the presidency, the Council of Ministers, provincial
and local governments, and the judicial system.286
2. Building a New Judicial System
To replace the void created by the collapse of the colonial court
system, the new government launched a new system of "courts" based on
the system of People's Tribunals and the concept of popular justice that
developed in the liberated areas during the struggle for national libera-
tion.28v With not a single Mozambican judge or prosecutor at the time of
independence, the new government embarked on a program to establish
Justice Brigades.288 In May 1978, the first Justice Brigades were sent
into the countryside to establish pilot People's Tribunals, with the aim of
establishing a tribunal in one locality of each province. 28 9 After several
months in the provinces, the members of the Justice Brigades reported
back to the Ministry of Justice which then called for a National Confer-
ence on Justice in August 1978.290 The resulting Law on Judicial Organ-
ization, adopted in December 1978, states: "[the] People's Tribunals will
be a means of enabling the people to resolve the problems and difficulties
which arise in the life of the community, whether in the locality, the
Communal Village, or the Communal Neighbourhood." 91
The Justice Ministry's adoption of this law created a "national court
system to replace the moribund and malfunctional colonial appara-
tus."'292 This new court system offered "most Mozambicans their first
opportunity to have cases tried in a court of their peers rather than by
capricious colonial administrators or collaborating chiefs."' 293 The Law
on Judicial Organization provides for a new court system consisting of a
"Supreme People's Tribunal and other courts... subject to the People's
Assembly. 294
286. The MOZAMBIQUE CONST. see arts. 43-49 (on the People's Assembly), art. 54 (on the
functions of the President), arts. 58-61 (on the Council of Ministers), arts. 63-66 (on Local
State bodies), and arts. 69-75 (on Judicial Organization).
287. Sachs, Changing the Terms of the Debate: A Visit to a Popular Tribunal In
Mozambique, 28 J. AFR. L. 99, 101 (1984).
288. Mozambique Information Agency, The Justice Brigades, reprinted in STATE PAPERS,
AND PARTY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 281, at 55.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 5 6.
291. Law on Judicial Organization (1978), reprinted in STATE PAPERS, AND PARTY PRO-
CEEDINGS, supra note 282, at 56.
292. Keehan, supra note 280, § 1.4(B)(1).
293. Id.
294. Law on Judicial Organization, art 1, reprinted in STATE PAPERS, AND PARTY PRO-
CEEDINGS, supra note 282, at 56-57.
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The Supreme People's Tribunal is made up of "at least six judges
appointed by the Minister of Justice... and at least eighteen elected
judges, half of whom act as substitutes." '295 Appeals are heard by sec-
tions of the Supreme People's Tribunal; each section operates with two
appointed and three elected judges.296 The next level of courts is com-
prised of Provincial People's Tribunals, staffed by one appointed presid-
ing judge and four elected judges except when the volume of work
justifies the organization of sections.297 Then each section consists of an
appointed judge and elected judges.298 The Maputo Provincial People's
Tribunal, for example, is "divided into three civil sections, five criminal
sections, a juvenile section, and a police section dealing primarily with
road accidents [with each section] composed of one appointed judge and
at least five judges elected by the provincial assembly."2 99 The District
People's Tribunals300 make up the next level of the court system handling
cases which involve either less serious crimes or smaller amounts. The
trials, like those in the provincial tribunals, are "characterized by a pre-
sumption of innocence, vigorous questioning of witnesses by the judges,
and intense debate between the public defender °1 and the state
prosecutor.,
302
3. Lay Participation in the New Judicial Order: Shaping the
Form and Content of Justice
Local tribunals, which constitute the foundation of the new legal
order, developed originally in the liberated zones during Mozambique's
struggle for national liberation. In these areas, colonial courts were re-
placed by tribunals formed by local communities and the liberation
movement. It was out of the practice of these tribunals that the princi-
ples of Popular Justice evolved. These principles which were to form the
basis of the new judicial order include:
justice that was popular in form, in that its language was open and
accessible; popular in its functioning, in that its proceedings were
295. Law on Judicial Organization art.4, supra note 282, at 57.
296. Law on Judicial Organization arts. 15(1) and (2), supra note 282, at 57.
297. Id. arts. 21(2) and (3).
298. Id. arts. 21(1), (2), and (3), at 58.
299. Keehan, supra note 280, § 1.4(B)(3).
300. Law of Judicial Organization, supra note 282, art. 29.
301. After independence only about 25 lawyers remained in the country and the profession
was subsequently nationalized. All lawyers now work for the State as legal officers and are
divided into two groups: state prosecutors and public defenders. Keehan, supra note 280,
§ 1.6(A) and (Q.
302. Id. § 1.4(B)(3).
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based essentially on active community participation; and popular in its
substance, in that judges drawn directly from the people were to give
judgement in [the] interests of the people.30 3
Popular Justice thus developed in the "liberated zones," in the vac-
uum left by the ffight of both the colonial and traditional authorities.30 4
The need to consolidate a new type of government in these areas "forced
the rapid evolution of new types of judicial structures. 30 5
The creation of new organs of local power in the post-colonial pe-
riod, including local tribunals, involved active participation by women
from the Women's Organization and by young people from the Youth
Organization. 306 This resulted in the shaping of new social norms; for
example
the de facto union as the central institution in family law, emerged
from the practice of the local Popular Tribunals, 30 7 and was not the
fruit of legal thought in the far-away capital, where lawyers were not
easily budged from the view that official marriage was the norm and
unregistered marriages something marginal to the courts. 30 8
As a result, the status of the de facto marital union became central
to the new Family Code and "thereby the great bulk of the population
whose marriages [had] not been registered [were] brought within the ju-
risdiction of the state courts."30 9
The Law on Judicial Organization (L.J.O.) formally recognized the
development of local tribunals by providing for the establishment of Lo-
cal People's Tribunals and even Neighborhood People's Tribunals in
larger communities. 310 These Local and Neighborhood People's Tribu-
nals are made up entirely of elected judges31' who are "selected either by
the local legislative assembly, if it has already been established, or by the
303. Sachs, supra note 287, at 99.
304. Id. at 102. Throughout the colonial period, chiefs who opposed colonial authority
were removed, while those who collaborated with the colonial state were rewarded by "gifts
necessary to 'open' the court." Thus, traditional chiefs were replaced by collaborators. 'Tradi.
tional' authority became so closely identified with colonial power that when the latter was
destroyed, the former collapsed with it. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 103. See Sachs' argument that "[tjhe records of the Popular Tribunal of
Mairaria played an important part ... in the discussion of the evolution of the draft new
Family Code.. ." Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Law on Judicial Organization, supra note 282, at 60, art. 16 §§ 4 & 5.
311. Id. art. 37.
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community at large." '312 All elected judges, factory workers, clerks,
teachers, nurses, and peasants take two-month paid leaves of absence
from their other full-time jobs in order to sit on the courts.313 For exam-
ple, all five members of the Local People's Tribunal of the Communal
Village of Maiaria in Northern Mozambique were farmers or workers in
the village.314 In order to overcome the lack of formal training and
problems of illiteracy among lay judges who must keep records of their
decisions,315 mobile judicial brigades make periodic visits to "explain
new legislation and provide a broader political orientation."316 Further-
more, "national literacy campaigns have given special priority to court
members. 317
4. Mediation as the Basis of Judicial Practice in the Local
Tribunals
The popularity of the new courts, "proved by the volume of business
that is voluntarily brought to them,"3"1 may be explained in part by the
central role that mediation and compromise play in the process of the
court. The Law on Judicial Organization requires that the local tribunal
"shall always first attempt to reconcile the parties, unless to do so con-
flicts with any legal requirement. ' 31 9 Only if conciliation between the
parties is not achieved or does not seem possible does the L.J.O. author-
ize the court to judge minor civil suits and petty offenses.3 ° In addition,
Article 38(2) limits the power of the tribunal in the resolution of petty
offenses to:
(a) Public criticism;
(b) Deprivation, for up to 30 days, of the exercise of the right
whose unreasonable use caused the offence;
(c) Rendering service to the people for up to 30 days;
(d) A fine of not more than 1,000 escudos;
(e) Compensation for the damage caused by the offence, either as
the sole remedy or along with any of the others.3 21
The emphasis upon collective mediation and conciliation reflects the
312. Keehan, supra note 280, § 1.4(B)(5).
313. Id. § 1.4(C)(1).
314. Sachs, supra note 287, at 99.
315. See Sachs, supra note 287, app.
316. Keehan, supra note 280, § 1.4(C)(2).
317. Id.
318. Sachs, supra note 287, at 105.
319. Law of Judicial Organization, supra note 282, art. 38(1).
320. Id. art. 38(2).
321. Id.
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form, if not the content, of traditional customary law. Thus despite criti-
cism of the normative dimension of customary law, there is
active support in relation to its institutional dimension . . [of] the
traditional forms of decision-making, which were redistributed, trans-
formed and absorbed in the system of popular justice, and which give
to popular justice a great dose of vitality and personality. It is not by
accident that, today, illiterate peasants give solutions to a range of the
people's problems in a just and rapid way; they have behind them the
experience of generations of people used to solve [sic] conflicts in col-
lective patterns.32 2
5. Social Change and the New Judicial Order
The transformation of the judicial order in Mozambique has not
been limited to the local level. The whole judicial system has been built
on the basis of popular justice, with participation of lay jurists through-
out the system. Professionally trained judicial officers and lawyers may
have greater influence than lay participants in the higher courts, but they
remain subject to recall by the relevant legislative bodies. The relative
success of the Popular Justice system in Mozambique can be ascribed in
part to the experience gained in the struggle for national liberation and to
the weakness of any contending judicial order. Although the inherited
institutional void both required and allowed the emergence of a com-
pletely new judicial order, the lack of resources has caused the new judi-
cial system to developed unevenly. The degree of development in each
region depends on the extent of political mobilization and resources
available at the local level. This has been exacerbated in recent years by
the disruption of all forms of social organization brought on by South
African backed attacks and destabilization.
Despite these difficulties, and the subsequent collapse of these new
forms, the significance of the Mozambican experience is the role played
by the new judicial order in the process of social change. The popular
tribunals serve not only as forums where individual disputes can be set-
tled but have also "become instruments of public education, zones of
struggle between old ideas and new, in which the new always have the
advantage though they do not always triumph. ' 32 3 'he system of Popu-
lar Justice has, through the tribunals, adopted the methods of customary
dispute resolution while simultaneously opening a forum for the media-
tion of conflict between individuals and social forces unleashed by the
322. de Sousa Santos, supra note 277, at 95.
323. Sachs, supra note 287, at 106.
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process of rapid social change. In this way "[t]he people are the teachers
and the taught, the element of continuity in the process of change, the
agents of progress as well as of conservatism."
3 24
C. Restructuring the Old Institutions: Nicaragua
The case of Nicaragua indicates that despite a military victory, the
new government may find it necessary to use pre-existing resources to re-
establish administrative and judicial organization. Furthermore, when
embarking on a process of social change and in forming alliances inside
and outside state structures, the government will be faced with a new
balance of social forces that may either facilitate or hinder specific pro-
grams of social transformation the government may wish to advance.
The role of organizations and institutions present in the old society must
thus be recognized as factors in the emerging balance of forces.
1. Constitutional Formation as a Means of Building a New
Consensus: Stimuli and Constraints to Judicial
Transformation
In Nicaragua the impetus for drafting a new constitution came as
the new government felt the need to establish a system more consonant
with revolutionary values and goals. From the triumph in 1979, the legal
codes and norms from the Somoza period existed side by side with revo-
lutionary decrees issued by the Junta of National Reconstruction.?"
A unique aspect of the constitutional process in Nicaragua, as com-
pared with the examples of decolonization in Africa, was that the process
began only six years after the revolutionary government came to power.
The Special Constitutional Commission, appointed to produce the initial
draft, was established five months after the election of the National Con-
stituent Assembly. 26 A deliberate effort was made to respect the results
of the 1984 national elections in apportioning seats on the commission. 27
The governing Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) "agreed
to take fewer seats on the commission than it was entitled to so that all
parties would be represented. 3 21
The process by which the new Nicaraguan Constitution was shaped
reflected the balance of forces within Nicaragua. The ruling FSLN at-
tempted to constitute a broad alliance of those parties and social forces
324. Id.
325. Reding, Nicaragua's New Constitution, 4 WORLD PoL'Y J. 257, 259 (1987).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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that were prepared to unify around a constitutional compromise and thus
strengthen the fledgling revolution against the threat of United States-
funded Contra forces. The debates over and ratification of those provi-
sions in the Constitution relating to the protection of human rights3 29
and the status of property33° were particularly important to this unifying
process.
2. Reconstructing the Judicial Order: Resuscitating the Old
Judicial Structures and Experimenting with Increased
Lay Participation
Nicaragua inherited a functioning legal structure, but experienced a
severe shortage of personnel because many of the previous judicial of-
ficers had been close to the Somoza regime and fled following its col-
lapse.331 The Junta of National Reconstruction attempted to resuscitate
the legal system by passing the Fundamental Law, which repealed the
political Constitution of 1974.332 But, unlike Zimbabwe, the system suf-
fered from the departure of almost the entire judiciary and thousands of
lawyers. In 1984 it was estimated that there were only 1000 lawyers
compared to about 3000 before the revolution.333
With the aim of addressing this problem and introducing a system
of popular justice, a committee was established comprised of representa-
tives of the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Inte-
rior, and the Junta (before its dissolution in January 1985). This
committee began to formulate a project of judicial reform aimed at in-
jecting popular participation and procedural reform into the old court
structures.33 4 The goal of the project was to create ain antiformalist, oral,
public, concentrated, and flexible criminal procedure to ensure that ver-
dicts would be based in the reconstruction of the crime and its surround-
ing circumstances. 35
329. Id. at 262.
330. Id. at 270.
331. Blodgett, Law After the Fall: Nicaragua Struggles to Pull Justice from Revolution with
Special Tribunals, Political Work Farms, and Law-student Judges, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1984,
at 10, 11.
332. Id. at 10.
333. Id. at 11.
334. Thaman, Criminal Justice Issues in Revolutionary Nicaragua, SAN FRANCISCO BAR-
RISTER, Feb. 1986, at 22.
335. Id.
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3. Security Issues and Lay Participation: Bringing Judicial
Transformation into the Center of Political Conflict
Nicaragua's use of popular tribunals to deal with political cases
outside of the established judicial system focused political controversy on
these tribunals. This projected the conflict between the old and new judi-
cial order into the center of the political struggle, resulting in demands
for disbandment of the tribunals as part of the Central American Peace
Plan. The popular justice system has become so closely associated with
party-political struggle in Nicaragua that the political opposition opposes
the system - including the experiment in the Department Four region
south of Managua - on the grounds that it is a tool of the ruling FSLN
party. The popular justice experiment as well as the earlier Special
Tribunals and Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals face resistance from the
existing judiciary and legal profession on political and legal grounds. For
example, Alberto Saborio, president of the Nicaraguan Bar Association,
demanded the release of everyone tried by the people's tribunals and ac-
cused the tribunals of being "completely political."336
Criticism has focused on the Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals
(TPAs) created in 1983337 to "try Contras captured during the war." 338
The TPAs replaced the Special Tribunals which sat from 1979 until they
were disbanded in February 1981, having tried "6,000 members of the
military, officials and civilian employees of the [former] Somoza govern-
ment. ' 339 In both cases the panels consisted of one professional judge
who served as chair and two lay judges who were nominated by the mass
organizations [the Sandinista Defense Committees, the women's associa-
tion (AMNLAE), the workers' confederation (CST), and the peasant
confederation (ATC)] and appointed by the Junta.3 1 The tribunals al-
lowed any evidence to be introduced and assessed it by applying a sana
critica or "the correct human understanding in which the rules of logic
interplay with the personal experience of the judges" standard." Ap-
peals were limited to special appeals panels and their decisions could not
be appealed to regular courts.342
The appointment of the tribunals, particularly the more recent Pop-
336. San Francisco Chron., Sept. 10, 1987, at 19, col. 5.
337. THE LAWYERS COMMrTrEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS, NICARAGUA:
REVOLUTIONARY JusTIcE: A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 33
(1985) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMrrrEE].
338. Thaman, supra note 334, at 22.
339. LAWYERS COMMrrrEE, supra note 337, at 33.
340. Thaman, supra note 334, at 21; LAWYERS COMMrrrEE, supra note 337, at 34, 40-41.
341. Thaman, supra note 334, at 22.
342. LAWYERS COMMIrrEE, supra note 337, at 41.
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ular Anti-Somocista Tribunals and the proposed experiment with local
popular justice courts in the Department Four region, reflects the strug-
gle and balance of forces between the old judicial order (even though it
has been staffed by appointees of the new government) and attempts to
develop a new system of popular justice. As one commentator notes:
The pluralist supreme court maintains that all judiciary functions
should be under its aegis, whereas the Sandinista leadership, distrustful
of judges and legal professionals, wants to create a new justice system
under the Ministry of Justice consisting of popular tribunals. The revo-
lutionary leadership contends that the established court system is too
slow and that bourgeois judges and juries mete out a class justice an-
tagonistic to the revolution. The judiciary decries the abridgement of
the right to a fair trial and the lack of due process inherent in many
procedures followed by the tribunals.343
4. Reining Back on Judicial Transformation: A Casuality of
Political Compromise
On January 18, 1988, President Daniel Ortega suspended all trials of
national security cases by the popular tribunals mid said that all cases
awaiting judgment would be transferred to the regular courts.344 The
Nicaraguan Government also formally lifted the State of Emergency and
disbanded the "people's courts" as required under the Central American
Peace Plan signed on August 5, 1987. 311 Nicaragua's use of "popular
justice" to address security issues served to "over-politicize" the process
of judicial transformation by projecting it into the center of the political
stage. This regionalization of the struggle between the old and new social
forces in Nicaragua has already resulted in the demise of the popular
tribunals and may well hinder present and future efforts to reform the
inherited judicial order.
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE:
SOUTH AFRICA
Recent events in South Africa demonstrate that the experiences of
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Nicaragua, particularly in respect to judi-
cial organization at the local community level, may provide insights into
forms of judicial organization that may challenge the viability and legiti-
macy of the present judicial order.
343. Thaman, supra note 334, at 22.
344. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 19, 1988, at 14, col. 1 (home ed,).
345. NEXIS, The Associated Press, Jan. 19, 1988.
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A. The Emergence of "People's Courts": Community Self-Help as a
Basis for Future Lay Participation in the Judicial Order
In South Africa a number of alternative sources of power emerged
in black residential areas during the height of the 1984-1987 uprisings.
These included new forms of political organization such as street com-
mittees and "people's courts."'  In some regions these rudimentary
forms of people's power involved "sophisticated forms of organisation
based on street and area committees." 3  But, there were "substantial
regional differences in the development of people's courts," with some
being "formed as part of extra-parliamentary structures... accountable
to the progressive movements" and others having less political or organi-
zational coherence.348
In the township of Mamelodi, for example, the collapse of the gov-
ernment sponsored community councils paved the way for residents' self-
government. Residents set up their own courts as more and more people
failed to report cases to the police.3 49 A member of one court, rejecting
suggestions that these were kangaroo courts established to eliminate dis-
senters, explained that the "main aim is rehabilitation, to re-educate the
wrongdoer and make him a better person.1350 The aims of the street
committees and people's courts included, "controlling crime, politicizing
residents against the local apartheid authorities and educating them
about the broader struggle." Court members argued that the "commu-
nity must be the judge and see that justice is done.... Many people who
have opposed us have been converted and now work with us."1,,z
A member of a Mamelodi court acknowledged malpractices had oc-
curred and that the courts in other areas may have been associated with
"necklacing" (the execution of police informers by placing vehicle tires
doused with gasoline around their necks and setting them on fire).3 52
346. Jaffee, Beyond the Cannon of Mamelod" Creating Mass Power, WORK IN PROGRESS
4, 6 (No.41, April 1986).
347. Swilling, The United Democratic Front and Township Rewolt, WORK IN PROGRESS 26,
30 (No.49, Sept. 1987). Each street elects a street committee, which in turn elects representa-
tives to an area committee. Id.
348. SchFrf, People's Justice, 30 SASH, Mar. 1988, at 19, 20.
349. Nyaka, Filling the Void Left by the Council's Collapse, Weekly Mail, May 9-15, 1986,
at 9, col. 1.
350. Honey, Street Committeer People Power or Kangaroo Courts?, Weekly Mail, May 9-
15, 1986, at 9, col. 5.
351. Id. at 9, cols. 4 & 5.
352. Schiirf, supra note 348, at 20. However it should be noted that Wilfried Schrf, a
senior lecturer at the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cape Town, and one of the
few who studied the development of the People's Courts in this period, states in his article on
the People's Courts that he is "not aware of incidents anywhere in South Africa in which
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However, he said that "no court in Mamelodi has ever sentenced anyone
to the necklace," and pointed out that "malpractices... are discouraged
as much as crime itself, because they could rebound on the struggle ....
We must gain confidence in what we are doing, so that [the residents] can
break away totally from government structures. The government must
become irrelevant to their lives." '353 Sentences ranged from community
tasks to corporal punishment such as lashes in a rape case. Although the
"courts" did not use formal legal procedures, they generally heard each
side of the story before reaching a verdict. Appeals, were heard by a spe-
cial court which met once a week.35 4
But, not all the people's courts were organized by community orga-
nizations. In some instances they became vehicles for criminal gangs or
for conducting campaigns against political opponents. In October 1985 a
leader of the United Democratic Front in the Eastern Cape "briefly
emerged from hiding to 'condemn the parading of people before these so-
called kangaroo courts.' "
In response to the emergence of these alternative sources of commu-
nity control, the state has targeted them as particular candidates for re-
pression. Participants in people's courts have been charged with treason
and subversion.356 Most prominent of these treason cases is the Alexan-
dra people's court trial.35 7 Community leaders of the Alexandra town-
ship, situated in the middle of Johannesburg, were charged with treason
and subversion because they took over the area's administration. 3 8 At
the height of resistance, they established both street committees and peo-
ple's courts to replace the vacuum left by the collapse of government
structures.359 Five Atteridgeville residents were charged in another case
with furthering the aims of the African National Congress by participat-
ing in a people's court:
Police raided this court, which was dealing with a minor dispute be-
tween two youngsters, one of whom broke a pair of spectacles belong-
ing to the other. The two were called before a court, and told to resolve
someone was sentenced to be necklaced by a People's Court." He found only one "People's
Court"-related necklacing incident in which a "former chairman of the KTC People's Court
was necklaced when a group of people, some of whom were victims of his particularly harsh
sentences... subjected him to an impromptu 'hearing' which they simply convened amongst
themselves on the spot." Id.
353. Honey, supra note 350, at 9, col. 5.
354. Id. at 9, col. 5.
355. M. MURRAY, SOUTH AFRICA: TIME OF AGONY, TIME OF DESTINY 391 (1987).
356. Moss, State Moves Against People's Courts, 46 WORK IN PROGRrSS 37, (Feb. 1987).
357. Delmas Returns to QuietAnonymity, Weekly Mail, July 3-9, 1987, at 10.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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their differences amicably. They were later called before the court
again and reprimanded for shouting abuse at each other in the street.
During these proceedings police stormed the church hall where this
was taking place, and arrested those present.36
The emergence of people's courts as a rudimentary form of popular
justice in areas where the government's local authorities have collapsed
reveals both the extent to which the black population views existing
courts as illegitimate, and their desire to create popular courts as a legiti-
mate alternative. People's courts gained the greatest degree of legitimacy
in areas of intense political mobilization, and became, as in Mozambique,
arenas of struggle between old and new ideas. On the other hand, in
areas where courts were seen as vehicles of partisan political conflict or
as corrupted by individual ambitions they lost their credibility and were
condemned by community leaders.
People's courts in South Africa are not an isolated or completely
new development. Rather, they build on a rich tradition with roots in
both the traditional precolonial courts and in a host of informal legal
structures that have existed over the years in the black townships, such
as the Western Cape-based "Isolomzi and the Amavoluntiya of the 1960s
and 1970s.''361 Their most direct antecedent, however, was the people's
courts that replaced the Chiefs or "Bush Courts" during the Pondoland
Revolt in the early 1960s.362
This most recent experience of people's courts builds on previous
examples of informal legal forms in two significant ways. First, the more
"institutionalized" people's courts gained experience in applying rudi-
mentary principles of popular justice, including recondilation and reha-
bilitation; and second, these courts emerged and functioned in the
context of the struggle for people's power in the townships. Conse-
quently, the "progressive movements will... have taken cognisance of
the mistakes made in the establishment and running of people's courts
... during 1985-6 [and] [w]hen the next opportunity presents itself to
reintroduce them, their structure and procedure are likely to reflect these
lessons. "
363
Furthermore these experiences may well foreshadow the future
transformation of South Africa's judicial order, at least at the local level.
Recognizing the significance of the emergence of these informal courts,
some members of the present judiciary have openly discussed the white
360. Moss, supra note 356, at 38.
361. Sc f, supra note 348, at 23.
362. G. MBEKI, SOUTH AFRICA: THE PEASANTS' REVOLT 125 (1984).
363. Schrf, supra note 348, at 23.
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courts' lack of legitimacy among black South Africans; this awareness
has led some judges to show a "new concern" for human rights.3 64
B. The Constitutional Framework: Stimulating or Restricting Future
Judicial Transformation and Legitimacy
Judicial transformation is preceded in the process of decolonization
by questions of constitutional formation which place initial constraints or
parameters upon any new judicial order. The existence and vitality of
the inherited legal order will also help shape the form and degree of re-
structuring undertaken by the new government.
.Although it is widely recognized that a future constitution will most
likely emerge from negotiations for the establishment of a majority rule
government, different sectors of South African society are already pro-
moting the idea of a "bill of rights" for the new constitution. The busi-
ness community released a "Charter of Social, Economic and Political
Rights," or Business Charter in January 1986.365 Describing its initiative
as an attempt to avoid "growing economic and political isolationism and
a drift into a repressive siege society," the Federated Chamber of Indus-
tries said it had drawn up the Business Charter (reminiscent in some
ways to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and even the Free-
dom Charter) to commit the business community to "fundamental demo-
cratic values and human rights. '366 This initiative was preceded in
August 1986 by the announcement that the South African Law Commis-
sion was "conducting an investigation into group and human rights and
called for suggestions, inter alia, on a bill or bills of human and group
rights."3 6 7 Speaking at the ruling National Party's Transvaal Congress,
the Minister of Justice noted that "once a satisfactory bill of rights had
been drawn up there was no reason why the government should not com-
mit itself to it."'368 But as a professor of law at the University of Pretoria
noted, "it was inconceivable that a credible and effective bill of rights
could exist and be applied while there were so many apartheid laws still
on the statute book. '3 69
To be effective, any bill of rights requires not only adherence to its
364. Haysom & Kahanovitz, supra note 146, at 23.
365. Business cheers for FCI's charter, Weekly Mail, Jan. 24-30, 1986, at 11, col. 1.
366. Id.
367. SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, QUARTERLY COUNTDOWN
THREE, at 7 (Oct. 1986).
368. Id.
369. Id. The experience of the bill of rights included in the ]ophuthatswana bantustan's
constitution is ample testimony to the failure of a bill of rights within the apartheid system.
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principles but a belief in its legitimacy among citizens. The Freedom
Charter, with its broad base of popular support, could serve as a bill of
rights for a future nonracial and democratic South Africa. If this is ac-
cepted its interpretation becomes the central issue. Some may argue that
the Supreme Court is the logical bearer of this responsibility. However,
this would be inappropriate because "until South African law sheds its
racist and repressive structures, until it ceases to be used as, and seen as,
an instrument of white domination, it cannot contribute positively to the
process of change., 370
A viable alternative would be the establishment of a separate consti-
tutional court which would arbitrate between the differing interpretations
of the Charter. The composition of this court would have to reflect the
social interests of the majority of South Africans. The best way of reflect-
ing these interests would be to grant different sectors, such as the trade
unions, community organizations, women's organizations, youth organi-
zations, business organizations, and elected representatives, the right to
appoint members of the court. This form of representation would ensure
that the present legitimacy enjoyed by the Freedom Charter is repro-
duced, through interpretation, to serve the needs of the social order that
will emerge in a postapartheid South Africa.
V. CONCLUSION
The present judicial order in South Africa is a product of the system
of internal colonialism that continues there. The courts generally serve
the interests of the executive but under pressure of anti-apartheid resist-
ance, they have at times become the terrain upon which struggles could
be fought to protect or extend the interests of particular individuals, or-
ganizations or communities. At the height of popular resistance, alterna-
tive judicial institutions emerged in areas where the formal system had
broken down. The experience of other countries that have recently un-
dergone major political and social transitions indicates that the judicial
order that may emerge in a future nonracial democratic South Africa will
find its roots in the struggles waged in the black townships.
As indicated by the experiences of Zimbabwe and Mozambique,
dramatic judicial transformation will most likely take place at the com-
munity level. In Zimbabwe, for example, despite severe constitutional
restrictions, the restructuring of the old judicial system has led to in-
creased lay participation in the local courts of first instance.
The exact form that the judicial order will take will be mediated by
370. Dugard, Using Law to Pervert Justice, 11 HUMAN Riarrs 22, 54 (1983).
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the process of political and constitutional transition. This process will
determine both the timing and extent of transformation, and reflect the
tension between varying social interests in the new society. As was the
case in Mozambique, major social dislocation in the process of political
change is likely to leave a severe shortage of material and human re-
sources. That outcome would probably result in a greater dislocation
and transformation of even the higher branches of the judicial order.
A negotiated political transition will, on the other hand, mean a
more gradual restructuring of the judical order with the increased likeli-
hood of continuing tensions between different forms, of judicial organiza-
tion. In this context the strains between old and new forms, including
tensions between professional control on the one hand and demands for
increased lay participation on the other, may result - as the Nicaraguan
experience demonstrates - in a politization of the process of judicial
transformation.
The legitimacy of new forms of judicial organization, particularly in
the forms of popular justice that may emerge in the process of political
transition, will be determined by the role played by these forums in the
struggle for political emancipation. The future judicial order in South
Africa will have to meet the challenges of the new social order. It must
provide a legitimate arena for the conflicting interests that will pervade
the social and political terrain as a new government attempts to build a
nonracial and democratic South Africa.
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